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Director : Professor Michael J. Laslovich
America's press have a societal purpose to inform the 
public so that the people can assert meaningful control over 
the governing process. However, media coverage of the recent 
health care debate suggests that the press is not fulfilling 
their democratic responsibility.
The introduction reviews several approaches to media 
studies, and outlines a method for studying the media's 
effect on the debate over President Clinton's health care 
reform proposal. Anti-government themes and anti-reform 
propaganda exacerbated a media feeding frenzy. Eventually, 
pack journalism engulfed President Clinton's proposal. The 
media focused on the surface aspects of the political debate, 
contributing little to the public's understanding of policy 
matters.
The case study illustrates the mass media's significant 
control and influence over the flow of information truncated 
the debate. The limited scope of media coverage often 
focused on the negative aspects of the President's proposal 
or the thrust and parry of politics, not in-depth analysis. 
Thus, media coverage often lacked context, reinforced 
conventional wisdom, and ultimately failed to help the public 
understand and decide on an important policy issue.
Considering that the public has demanded health care reform 
for the past two decades, the effect of the media's feeding 
frenzy was anti-democratic because it contributed not only to 
the defeat of President Clinton's health care proposal, but 
to any solution. The media treated the public as spectators, 
not as members of a society engaged in a difficult policy 
decision.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION:
THE MEDIA, DEMOCRACY, AND HEALTH CARE REFORM
To claim that America's media have an anti-democratic 
effect on domestic policymaking is to contradict the 
traditional belief that the press are "cantankerous, 
obstinate, and ubiquitous in their search for truth and their 
independence of authority."i Today, however, this standard 
conception is frequently challenged by even mainstream 
political commentators. For example, Charles E. Lindblom and 
Edward J. Woodhouse suggest that the media's attempts to be 
objective are more likely to reinforce "conventional 
interpretations of current events."2 By reinforcing 
conventional wisdom the media narrow the "competition of 
ideas," and fracture the "foundation of democracy —  the 
capacity of the citizen to analyze his or her own needs and 
to find policies for meeting them."3
“I Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing 
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1988), 298.
2 Charles E. Lindblom and Edward J. Woodhouse, The 
Policy Making Process 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : 
Prentice Hall Inc., 1993), 117.
3 Ibid., 124.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
However, the idea that the press simply narrow the 
competition of ideas is somewhat inadequate, given the 
importance of the media to deliberative democratic processes.
As Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky contend, America's media 
actually have a societal purpose, that is itself valuable. A 
democratic press can empower people "to assert meaningful 
control over the political process by providing them with the 
information needed for the intelligent discharge of political 
responsibilities."4
From Herman and Chomsky's viewpoint, the media's 
tendency to reinforce conventional wisdom and to focus on the 
surface aspects of political debate does more than just 
fracture a citizen's ability to choose "goods" from Lindblom 
and Woodhouse's supermarket of ideas. Instead, the media 
fosters a climate of conformity which can impede the public's 
ability to play an informed role in the policy-making 
process. Therefore, shallow media coverage actually 
truncates democratic debate.
Unlike the press's more manifest functions —  such as 
providing information —  curtailing political discourse is a 
latent function of America's market-based news media. It is 
these functions Herman and Chomsky are referring to when they 
contend that the media support the status quo and hinder the 
public's ability to "assert meaningful control over the 
political p r o c e s s . "5 The following chapters suggest that even
 ̂Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent. 298. 
5 Ibid.
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though the media obstruct the practice of democracy, the
result is not just a reaffirmation of the status quo.
Instead, the media can fortify a democracy without citizens,
which Benjamin Barber refers to as democracy's thin veneer:
[yielding] neither the pleasures of participation 
nor the fellowship of civic association, neither 
the autonomy and self-governance of continuous 
political activity nor the enlarging mutuality of 
shared public goods ... [it] is at best a politics 
of static interest, never a politics of 
transformation; a politics of bargaining and 
exchange, never a politics of invention and 
creation.... 6
There are many theoretical constructs which attempt to 
describe how America's media curtail democratic deliberation.
Yet, none of these are universally applicable. In order to 
shed further light on the media's anti-democratic effect, 
this thesis investigates the press's role in defeating the 
Clinton administration's health care initiative, and contends 
that their substantial influence over the flow of raw 
information, and their interpretations of that information, 
truncated the health care debate, and had an anti-democratic 
effect.
In pursuit of these goals, a three part overview is 
outlined in the remainder of this chapter. The initial 
section sketches out a conceptual approach specific to the 
media's effect on the health care debate. The second section 
establishes how the Clinton Administration formed the Health
^ Benjemiin Barber, Strong Danocracv; Participatory 
Politics for a New Age (Berkeley, Ca: University of
California Press, 1984), 24-25.
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Care Security Act of 1993. The final section describes the 
in-depth evaluation to be taken up in the following chapters.
Before preceding, however, it is important to make a 
point of clarification. This analysis draws a distinction 
between the "mass media" and the "media." The latter refers 
to the news media, the press or journalists. The term "mass 
media" is much broader. It refers to not only the media, but 
also other forms of news, marketing and entertainment 
delivered to the public via electronic and print mediums —  
such as information delivered through television, radio, 
films, newspapers, magazines, journals, and books.?
Part of the problem with media studies is that the 
barrier between the news media and other elements of the mass 
media have become increasingly blurred. For instance, is 
Rush Limbaugh providing people with news or is his radio 
program entertainment? One could also question whether ABC's 
"Prime Time Live" is a news or an entertainment program. Is 
Sam Donaldson a journalist, an entertainer or a political 
commentator? The fact that these distinctions increasingly 
lack distinction is important because news coverage is 
packaged —  by the reporter's tone and interpretations of 
events. If information is being framed for entertainment 
value instead of information value, it can alter the message 
conveyed.
 ̂Leo F. Jefferies, Mass Media Processes 2nd ed. 
(Prospect Heights, II: Westland Press, Inc., 1994), 3
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Conceptualizing the Media's Influence on Democracy
A common problem when studying news coverage is that 
empirical proof of the media's influence on society can be 
inconclusive. However, one may nonetheless theoretically 
conceptualize and interpret the media's effect on 
participatory democracy. One way to do this is to begin with 
the premise that internal and external factors influence 
press coverage, which shapes raw information contributing to 
media content, i.e., content influence studies. The media's 
messages are dependent variables determined by influential 
factors which are the independent v a r i a b l e s . 8
There are also process and effect studies. As the 
terminology suggests, these studies are concerned with how 
media content affects society. For instance, a common 
research question is whether news coverage of violence causes 
children to be more aggressive. In such studies, media 
content is considered to be the independent variable.8 This 
analysis investigates the press's influence on the health 
care debate; thus it is primarily a content effects study. 
However, it is necessary to determine and organize what 
factors influenced media content during the debate prior to 
contending that it had an anti-democratic effect because some 
factors were more relevant than others.
^ Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese. Mediating 
the Message: Theories of influences on Mass Media Content.
2nd ed. (White Plains, NY: Longman Publishers USA, 1996), 4,
11.
9 Ibid., 3-4.
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Two predominant ways to analyze influences on news media 
content are Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, and Larry 
Sabato's feeding frenzy approach. The former is considerably 
more controversial and focuses on mass media, while the 
latter is widely accepted and focuses exclusively on the news 
media.
Herman and Chomsky contend that the media serve the ends 
of America's elite by systematically disseminating propaganda 
and manufacturing the public's consent to an elite political 
agenda. 10 Although their conclusion resembles a conspiracy 
theory, Chomsky adamantly refutes such charges, "If I give an 
analysis of, say, the economic system, and I point out that 
General Motors tries to maximize profit and market share, 
that's not a conspiracy theory, that's an institutional 
analysis.... [T]hat's precisely the sense in which we are 
talking about the media."H
However, Herman and Chomsky also stress that even though 
the media may favor elite interest, the media "are not a 
solid monolith on all issues. "12 Members of the elite often 
disagree, and political debate within the media reflects a 
"diversity of tactical judgments [among elites] on how to 
attain generally shared aims."13 Disagreement can be fierce
Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, xii.
11 Mark Archbar, ed. Manufacturing Consent: Noam
Chomsky and the Media (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1994),
131.
12 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, xii.
12 Ibid., xii.
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but opinions challenging the dominant ideology are 
systematically excluded from media content by the press's 
"selection of topics, distribution of concerns, framing of 
issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone, and by 
keeping debate within the bounds of acceptable p r i n c i p l e s .
The exclusion of dissenting opinions erodes the traditional 
functions of the press, while favoring one of its more latent 
functions —  manufacturing the consent of the 
"disenfranchised m a s s e s ."is
According to Chomsky, this latent function of the media 
is necessary to legitimize the status quo. Since the United 
States is not a dictatorship, it is unable to ensure public 
obedience by force. Thus, its leaders must control public 
thought and political debate because "thought can lead to 
action and ... the threat to order must be exercised at the 
source. "16 Chomsky contends that it is necessary for the 
elite to "establish a framework for possible thought that is 
constrained within the principles of the state religion."i?
The "state religion" is the collective fundamental beliefs of 
the citizenry. For Americans these include rights to 
property and free speech. In Chcmsky's view, strict 
adherence to these rights has sanctified the privileges of 
those who own a majority of the country's capital and has
14 Ibid., 298.
15 Ibid., 1-2.
15 Noam Chomsky, The Chomsky Reader (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1987), 132.
17 Ibid.
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defined the public's conception of democracy. Thus, "It was
In the service of democracy" that the media —  radio,
television, and newspapers —  were "kept from the public
domain and handed over to a few huge corporations... ."is
Even though private ownership Influences media content,
It represents only one of five Interrelated Influences, or
filters, through which members of the elite can control the
media. The five, outlined In Herman and Chcmsky's structural
analysis. Include:
(1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and 
profit orientation of the domlnauit mass-medla firms; (2) 
advertising as the primary Income source of the mass 
media; (3) the reliance of the media on Information 
provided by government, business, and "experts" funded 
and approved by these primary sources and agents of 
power; (4) "flak" as a means of disciplining the media; 
and (5) "anticommunism" as a national religion and 
control mechanism. 19
The result of raw Information passing through these filters 
Is an elite Interpretation of reality that establishes "the 
premises of discourse and Interpretation," controls the 
political agenda, and defines "what Is newsworthy In the 
first p l a c e ."20
Sabato's approach differs significantly from that of 
Herman and Chomsky's. There Is no hint of conspiracy In a 
media feeding frenzy. Instead, It Is "any political event or 
circumstance where a critical mass of journalists leap to
Noam Chomsky, Powers and Prospects (Boston: South
End Press, 1996), 119.
Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 2.
20 Ibid.
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cover the same embarrassing or scandalous subject and pursue 
it intensely, often excessively, and sometimes
uncontrollably."21
The effects of feeding frenzies vary according to the 
event, or collection of events, they revolve around. Since 
the public's view of politics is, for the most part, a by­
product of what they gather frcan the news media, feeding 
frenzies can contribute to collective optimism or pessimism. 
Thus, the ramifications of aggressive media coverage are not 
all negative. As Sabato explains, since Watergate there has 
been an increased openness and accountability required of 
politicians and government which has had some positive 
effects on public awareness. Unfortunately, another 
consequence has been press coverage that has contributed to 
the trivialization of political discourse, because the press 
often end up treating "venial sins and mortal sins as equals, 
rushing to make every garden-variety scandal another 
Watergate,"22 in effect much of the news is not news at all, 
or as Sabato opines, "peccadilloes have supplanted policy on 
the front pages," and this decivilizes politics.23
There are a variety of causes for feeding frenzies. In 
describing some of the difficulties encountered by the 
Clinton administration, W. Lance Bennett suggests that a lack
21 Larry Sabato, Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism 
Has Transformed American Politics. (New York: The Free
Press, 1991) 6.
22 Ibid., 200, 208-209.
23 Ibid-
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of cooperation and unfavorable press relations between the 
Administration and the Washington Press Corps fueled a series 
of feeding frenzies. Clinton and his staff were resentful 
about their treatment by the press during the 1992 campaign.
Once in the White House, they attempted to "go over the 
heads" of the press by holding electronic town hall meetings 
and attempting to stage news events. According to Bennett, 
many members of the press felt that this "amounted to a 
declaration of war on journalism's elite c o r p s . "24 From 
there, other questionable mishaps —  such as the Clintons' 
involvement in Whitewater, a questionable land deal in 
Arkansas —  became prime targets for feeding frenzies.
Bennett's observation suggests that media coverage of 
the Clinton Administration, and perhaps the health care 
debate itself, could be adequately explained by a feeding 
frenzy. However, it is helpful to understand that feeding 
frenzies are the result of an "interplay of influences."
This term has been used by Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Karlyn 
Kohrs Campbell to conceptualize media processes as societal 
processes. Thus the following chapters describe "not only 
how the media influence us, but how the media are, in turn, 
influenced by others —  individuals, groups, government 
agencies, politicians, and other mass m e d i a . "25
24 w. Lance Bennett, The Politics of Illusion 3rd ed. 
(New York: Longman Publishers, 1996), 132-133.
25 Kathleen Hall Jamieson, and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell.
The Interplay of Influence; Mass Media & Their Publics in 
News, Advertising, Politics. (Belmont, California; Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1983), 1.
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However, it is still necessary to determine which 
influences are significant, and to organize their 
interactions. One way to do this is to utilize a structural 
approach based on the two types of studies mentioned earlier 
—  content influence studies and process and effects studies.
This thesis combines the two, forming a relevant influences 
and content effects approach. This approach illustrates how 
a feeding frenzy consumed President Clinton's health care 
initiative, and leads to the conclusion that the media can 
have an anti-democratic effect.
Two of Herman and Chcansky's "filters" were predominant 
influences on media coverage of the health care debate: 
"anticommunism" as a national ideology and control mechanism; 
and "flak" as a means of keeping the media in line. This is 
not to say that the influence of the other filters —  the 
media's profit orientation, their dependence on advertising 
as a primary source of income, and their reliance on 
information provided by government agencies, businesses, and 
think tanks —  did not play a role in swaying media coverage. 
However, their effects can be accounted for while focusing on 
dominant ideology and flak.
Anti-Communistic themes easily translate into pro- 
American themes, such as liberty, individuality and property 
rights.26 since these concepts have competing definitions 
they can not only be used freely, and often spuriously, but 
they can also encompass dominant ideological themes. When
26 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 29.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Herman was questioned about limiting this conception to 
"anti-Communism," he conceded that "dominant ideology" would 
probably be more appropriate in extending the filter beyond 
the nature of Cold War dichotomies, and to include elements 
vital to established interests. The reason he and Chomsky 
chose to focus on anti-communism was because they "wanted to 
focus on the ideological element that has been the most 
important as a control and disciplinary mechanism in the U.S. 
political e c o n o m y ."27 Thus members of the mass media often 
become dependent on dominant themes other than anti-communism 
to communicate messages. Therefore, this analysis utilizes 
the conception of dominant ideological themes.
These themes are often appealed to by producers of 
"flak," negative reactions to media commentary or programing 
distributed through issue-orientated advertising, private 
publications and expert opinions. Most flak is subsidized by 
businesses, organizations, interests groups, and think- 
tanks .28 Not surprisingly, Herman and Chcxnsky contend that 
the dominant producers of flak are the established right wing 
of American p o l i t i c s .29 Beth Schulman, associate publisher of 
In These Times, a left-of-center publication, agrees since 
they are better funded, "America's conservative 
philanthropies eagerly fund the enterprise of shaping of
Monthly Review, January, 1989, as cited by Archbar, Noam 
Chomsky and the Media, 108.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 26-28.
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opinion and defining policy debates ... similar efforts by 
progressive philanthropies are, by comparison, sporadic."30
From 1990 to 1993, private grants to the leading political 
magazines of the right wing, such as American Spectator and The 
New Criterion, were eighty-two percent higher than private grants 
to comparable magazines of the left wing, such as The Progressive 
and The Nation. John Tirman, director of the Winston Foundation 
and a board member of the Foundation for National Progress, agrees 
that the "right" influences government policy makers on a 
"conveyor belt from think tanks, academics and activists," 
enabling them to dominate policy debates.3i
As will be discussed later, "flak" during the health care 
debate was prevalent but it originated from anti-reform activists, 
which differs significantly from the generic perception of 
America's right wing. In particular, many of the largest health 
insurance corporations had supported President Clinton's proposed 
universal, managed-care system, in which the government would set 
certain guidelines for coverage to be delivered by private 
insurance agencies. To many in the health insurance industry, 
managed competition seemed be preferable to a government takeover 
of health care. 32
30Beth Schulman, "Foundations for a Movement: How the Right
Wing Subsidizes its Press," Extra: The Magazine of FAIR.
March/April, 1995, 11.
31 Ibid., 11-12.
32 Jeff Cohen and Norman Solcmon, Through The Media 
Looking Glass: Decoding Bias and Blather in the News
(Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), 84-85.
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The Clinton Plan
By the 1992 Presidential election, the public had joined 
many health insurers in realizing the need to reform health 
care. Fifteen percent of the population had no health care 
insurance, many others feared that they too would lose their 
coverage, and increasing medical costs were consuming twelve 
percent of the nation's GNP and increasing budget deficits.33 
On the eve of Clinton's inauguration, health care was second 
only to the economy among the problems Americans wanted 
addressed most.34 in fact, the findings of Harris and CBS/New 
York Times polls suggested that governmental attention to 
health care reform had been long overdue. The polls found 
that since 1982 seventy-five percent or more of the 
population believed America's health care system needed to be 
either fundcumentally changed or completely rebuilt.35
Early in the presidential primaries, candidate Clinton 
neither embraced the untested idea of managed competition nor
33 Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic 
Policy; The Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in The Clinton 
Presidency: First Appraisals, ed. Colin Campbell and Bert A,
Rockmann (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers,
1996), 274.
34 Robert J. Blendon, Mollyann Brodie, Tracey Stelzer 
Hyams, and John M. Benson, "The American Public and the 
Critical Choices for Health Care Reform," Journal of the 
American Medical Association 271 (1994): 1539-44, as cited by 
Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic Policy: The 
Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in The Clinton Presidency, ed. 
Campbell and Rockmann, 274.
35 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Don't 
Blame The Public for Failed Health Care Reform," Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law. 20 n2 (Spring, 1995): 416- 
17.
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a Canadian-style, "single-payer" health care system like that 
supported by one of his opponents. Senator Robert Kerry.
(The term single-payer is used because all fees for health 
services are channeled through one entity —  either the 
federal or state government, or a regional organization.
Services are still provided by privately owned facilities.)36 
Instead, Clinton tacitly supported a "play or pay" 
approach which would require employers to either offer health 
insurance to their workers or pay into a governmental fund to 
expand coverage for uninsured Americans. However, his 
support for this approach decreased when he entered the 
general election against President Bush and independent Ross 
Perot. Clinton wanted to campaign as a "New Democrat," but 
Bush painted his "play or pay" approach as a tax and spend 
program more characteristic of the old Democratic Party, and 
Perot's recalcitrant budget cutting rhetoric seemed to 
reinforce Bush's charges,37
By September, 1992, Clinton endorsed the idea of 
managed competition. According to Theda Skocpol the change 
was Clinton's way of finding a middle ground between the 
promise of universal coverage and the demands of the health 
insurance industry. Additionally, it seemed achievable
36 Theda Skocpol, Boomerang: Clinton's Health Security
Effort and the Turn against Government in U. S. Politics, 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 32.
37 Ibid., 34-39.
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because the idea had gained the political endorsement of 
influential journalists and academic policy experts.38
Beginning in the summer of 1991, economist Dr. Michael 
Winstein, a member of the New York Times editorial board, had 
endorsed managed competition in more than two dozen of the 
paper's editorials.39 in addition many of managed 
competition's fundamentals had been envisioned by Stanford 
economist Alain Enthoven, who formed the "Jackson Hole 
group," made up representatives from the "Big Five" insurance 
agencies —  Aetna, Cigna, Metropolitan Life, Prudential, and 
Travelers. 40
The ideas produced by the "Jackson Hole group" directly 
influenced Clinton's Health Security Act. They proposed 
requiring employers to make payroll contributions to health 
insurance premiums, financing expanded coverage. Second, 
they called for capping tax deductions for employer-provided 
health benefit plans at the lowest-priced plan in a given 
region, thereby forcing employers to invest in less expensive 
plans or pay the difference. Third, they wanted the 
government to form guidelines establishing what types of 
plans could be offered and for creating "health purchasing 
alliances" among smaller businesses so they could purchase 
insurance at lower rates.
38 Ibid., 41-42.
39 Ibid., 42.
40 Ibid., The group was named for sight of their first 
meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
41 Ibid., 42-43.
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The combination of these reforms would encourage the 
spread of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), offering 
basic and preventive care at reduced costs. One addition the 
Clinton camp made to the Jackson Hole group's outline was the 
institution of global budget caps, or a cap on overall 
government spending to ease the transition to the new
system. 42
A quasi-governmental health care system appealed to 
Clinton for a number of reasons. Politically, it was 
important to have a plan that did not propose new taxes, and 
did not completely relinquish private control of health care 
to the government. At the same time, Clinton was determined 
to provide universal coverage, but he knew that this goal 
could only be met if the plan simultaneously promoted cost 
containment. He also hoped that the approach would enable 
his administration to attract the support of powerful health 
industry interests for a plan that managed private 
competition within a budget, without the political yoke of 
increased taxes.43
During the campaign, Clinton was critical of President 
Bush's proposal; "the Bush plan would put another $100 
billion in tax credits through the same system between now 
and 1997, pouring good money after bad, with no plan for cost 
control."44 At the same time, he stressed that his own plan
42 Ibid., 43-44.
43 Ibid., 46.
44 Ibid., 45,
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was about "personal choice, private care, private insurance, 
private management, but a national system to put a lid on 
costs, to require insurance reforms, to facilitate 
partnerships between business, government, and health care 
providers. "45
After Clinton's inauguration, however, "Grand ideals met
obdurate fiscal reality...."46 The intricacies of the plan
had not been mapped out, and only the basic outline had
survived the test of public opinion. Thus, instead of
passing these general demands on to Congress, the President
decided to form a Health Care Task Force. The first lady
acted as its public spokesperson and, along with longtime
friend Ira Magaziner, constructed the bill. The
Administration believed that Congress, with its decentralized
power structure, would be unable to construct a
comprehensive health care package and unable to find that
"way through the middle" Clinton perceived was t h e r e . 47
From the viewpoint of Representative Pat Williams, chair
of the Labor subcommittee, the President's proposal
represented a grand compromise, but it had political
ramifications:
The President obviously had a number of plans and 
dozens of combinations to work with. In short he 
could have presented any plan he wanted, and he was 
being pulled this way and that by a lot of the 
groups that had been interested in health care for
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 49.
47 Ibid., 49-55.
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almost fifty years.... Clinton, then, was the 
Clinton that we now recognize better. He was the 
Clinton of the middle.... When it all came crashing 
down on him he frankly couldn't understand it for a 
long time because he thought he had moved toward 
the private health care industry.... He was going
to let them run it.  [However] I came to realize
very quickly that in order to properly provide 
access, to all of our people ... you have to have 
what on the surface appears to be a rather 
complicated set of rules.... The notion that one 
can reform health care access in America with very, 
very simple minor standards is n o n s e n s i c a l .48
Williams' insight begs many questions. Could media 
soundbites ever describe such a difficult piece of 
legislation to the American public? Could members of the 
press overcome their tendency to trivialize policy debate? 
Essentially, soundbites could have never been adequate, and 
that in itself truncates the public's understanding of policy 
matters. However, the press's failure during the health care 
debate transcended the media's inherent inadequacies. Many 
in the press were overly concerned with gossip, instead of 
governance, focusing on titillation rather than inquiry. The 
result was the trivialization of the health care debate 
rather than the enlightenment of the public.
48 Representative Pat Williams, interview by author, 25 
April 1997, Missoula, Montana, tape recording.
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The Media's Failure
Part of the reason the plan "came crashing down" was the 
media's portrayal of the President's proposal. As James 
Fallows contends, "the media failed in a historic way to help 
America understand and decide on this issue."49 How the 
media failed is explained in the following chapters.
Chapter Two, "Health Care is Un-American: Anti-
Government Sentiment and the Liberal Myth," investigates how 
media content was plagued with anti-government, anti-Clinton 
and euiti-reform themes, and how this trivialized the 
educational value of media reporting. The media were more 
concerned with focusing on the superficial aspects of the 
debate, and portraying President Clinton's plan as a liberal, 
bureaucratic approach to health care reform. There was 
little interest in probing or questioning the essence of the 
proposed policy itself. Much of what passed for public 
information and policy discourse was an unprecedented amount 
of negative propaganda.
Chapter Three, "Mountain of Misinformation: The Media
and Anti-Reform Flak" discusses how the media failed to 
critically evaluate misleading anti-government themes spread 
by interest groups, talk radio programs, and academic think 
tanks. An example was the "Harry and Louise" ads funded by
Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System; The 
American Wav of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 634.
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the Health Insurance Agency of America (HIAA). Their strategy 
was simple: play on American's distrust of government. The
preponderance of anti-reform propaganda blended with the 
media's concentration on the superficial aspects of the 
debate, and culminated into a feeding frenzy.
The fourth chapter, "No Exit: A Chart, A Scandal, And a
Bus Tour," analyzes four events during the health care debate 
and exhibits how media content was fed by numerous frenzies. 
Members of the press were busy "gauging and guessing who 
would win" on Capital Hill and "not in exploring what the 
consequences would be for the country."SO Haynes Johnson and 
David Broder suggest that this type of reporting is a product 
of the journalistic culture, "its professional mind-set and 
its commercial, ccanpetitive pressures."si
The final chapter, "The Anti-Democratic Effects of 
America's Media," elaborates on how the formation of media 
content contributed to an anti-democratic debate. In 
addition, it highlights that there may not be an all 
encompassing approach to media studies, no one element to be 
pointed to, and no conspiracy to be uncovered. However, if 
one looks at how the interplay of dominant ideological thanes 
and flak constructed much of media content during the health 
care debate, one can uncover how a feeding frenzy engulfed 
President Clinton's proposal.
Johnson and Broder, The System, 635. 
51 Ibid., 634.
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CHAPTER 2
HEALTH CARE IS UN-AMERICAN:
ANTI-GOVERNMENT SENTIMENT AND THE LIBERAL MYTH
In her 1996 work. Boomerang; Clinton's Health Security 
Effort and the Turn against Government in U. S. Politics, 
Theda Skocpol makes two observations about media coverage of 
the health care debate. First, anti-government themes, as 
well as anti-Clinton themes, dominated media content and 
demonized the administration's health care proposal.i At the 
same time, many journalistic accounts wrongly accused the 
Clintons of "devising a liberal, big-government approach to 
health care reform."2
Skocpol is correct, but one must also understand that 
the media's attention to anti-Clinton and anti-government 
themes was symptomatic of both the built up animosity many 
journalists had for the Clinton administration, and of the 
media's focusing, almost exclusively, on "the Clinton Plan." 
The combination of these elements produced media content 
lacking an in-depth and ongoing discussion of vital policy 
issues. Since the media did little to probe Clinton's plan, 
or discuss alternative reforms, they did little to broaden
1 Theda Skocpol, Boomerang: Clinton's Health Security
Effort and the Turn against Government in U. S. Politics (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 146-152,
2 Ibid., 15.
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the public's understanding of the debate's substance, or to 
discredit misinformation about "the Clinton Plan."
The media's interweaving of anti-government themes and 
liberal accusations portrayed the Clinton health package as 
"a regulatory rat's nest, a nightmare of overambitious social 
engineering, and a sweeping solution where modest reforms 
would do."3 Essentially, "the Clinton Plan became the left- 
wing alternative, not the comprehensive, econcmiically astute 
package that it was. As shown by a March, 1994, Wall Street 
Journal-NBC News poll, many in the public could not support 
"the Clinton Plan." The poll found that forty-five percent 
of those surveyed opposed President Clinton's Health Care 
Security Act, yet seventy-six percent favored an unlabeled 
plan which contained all the essential elements of Clinton's 
proposal. The Wall Street Journal concluded; "Mr. Clinton 
is losing the battle to define his own health-care bill."4 
However, the failure was not solely President Clinton's. The 
downfall of health care reform was exacerbated by journalists 
fanning the flames of discontent. This disdain for the 
Clinton Administration began well before the bill was 
introduced in September, 1993.
Antipathy toward government has always been a dcaninant 
ideological theme in American political thought, and these 
emotions can manifest in many ways —  animosity, bitterness.
^ James Fallows, A Triumph of Misinformation," Atlantic 
Monthly, 275 nl (January, 1995): 32.
^ Hilary Stout, "Many Don't Realize It's the Clinton 
Plan They Like," Wall Street Journal, 10 March 1994, 1(B) and 
6(B).
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spite, fear.5 in an August, 1992, memo to candidate Clinton, 
Senator Jay Rockefeller astutely recognized the importance of 
the public's psychology: "Voters fear losing coverage from
loopholes, job changes, layoffs or catastrophic illness....
Fear, much more than compassion, drives support for universal 
guarantees of coverage" (emphasis a d d e d ) .6 However,
Rockefeller also warned Clinton that their fear was offset by 
an equal threat: "Before long they will be asking: How 
would we pay for all that care for all those people? Won't 
it require a huge new government b u r e a u c r a c y ?  "7 So for many 
the debate became a choice of whom do you fear more, the 
insurance companies or the government?
Kathleen Hall Jamieson contends that the media increased 
the public's fear of "the Clinton Plan." The press rarely 
focused on the policy issues of reform, and when they did, 
they failed to investigate competing solutions. The media 
opted to concentrate on the attacks and counter-attacks 
forged by the proponents and adversaries of President 
Clinton's proposal. According to Jamieson, this
5 See Samuel Adams, "The Rights of the Colonists," in 
American Political Thought, 3rd ed., ed. Kenneth M. Dolbeare 
(Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), 37-
41; Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address," in American 
Political Thought, 184-187; Henry David Thoreau, "Civil 
Disobedience," in American Political Thought, 231-246; 
William Graham Sumner, "What Social Classes Owe to Each 
Other," in American Political Thought, 341-356.
 ̂Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System: The
American Wav of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 92.
7 Ibid., 93.
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concentration bred public skepticism, and left many saying to 
themselves, "Gee, everything is awful. I have nothing I can 
believe in. Let's just reject the whole bunch of them.
Let's just reject the whole p r o c e s s . "8
However, there is evidence to suggest that long before 
the public's rejection of "the whole process," a pack of 
journalists had already begun to feed around a turbulent 
White House. Only five months into his presidency, magazine 
headlines were denouncing President Clinton and his 
administration. The cover of the June 7, 1993, issue of 
Newsweek depicted a perplexed Bill Clinton —  arms crossed, 
one hand on his chin, gazing downward. Above him read the 
simple banner, "What's Wrong?"9 That same week, a miniature 
of President Clinton was pictured on the bottom of the cover 
of Time. Arms behind his back, he gazed upward at the bold 
headline, "THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING PRESIDENT."10 
Most of the initial turmoil for the Clinton 
Administration was not directly related to health care 
reform. Moreover, media coverage is not the result of a 
single event, but the interplay of events. Initial 
journalistic accounts of the administration set the tone for 
the media's coverage of health care reform. Journalists 
zeroed in on the administration's blunders and fed public
® The Great Health Care Debate, part of The Moyers 
Collection, (Princeton: Films for the Humanities and
Sciences, 1994). videotape.
^ Newsweek, 7 June 1993.
Time, 7 June 1993.
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cynicism. The media was not wholly to blame because 
Clinton's agenda was ambitious. As Barbara Sinclair notes,
"if several major efforts are going on at once, press 
coverage is even less predictable and more likely than usual 
to be harmful.... [TJhe press [chooses] the big story of the 
day and will almost always select the negative over the 
positive. Consequently, conducting several such campaigns 
simultaneously is nearly impossible,
A brief overview of a few of these episodes —  gays in 
the military, the failed nomination of Lani Guinier, and 
Travelgate —  underscores how an interplay of events 
influences media coverage, and demonstrates how media content 
contributed to the public's negative reaction to "the Clinton 
Plan." Eventually, there seemed "to be an almost visceral 
level of mistrust and dislike for Clinton, a rejection of him 
not as a leader or politician but as a p e r s o n . "  12 As 
controversies multiplied and the journalistic tone was set, 
vital questions concerning the administration's character, 
its honesty and the public's trust were never far from the 
headlines.
HBarbara Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively in a 
Negative Era,"in The Clinton Presidency; First Appraisals, 
ed. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockmann (Chatham, New Jersey: 
Chatham House Publishers, 1996), 112.
12George C. Edwards, "Frustration and Folly: Bill
Clinton and the Public Presidency," in Campbell and Rockman 
The Clinton Presidency, 240.
13 Ibid.
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The first controversy to arise came only two weeks after 
Clinton had taken the oath of office. During the campaign, 
he had promised to reverse the ban on homosexuals in the 
United States Armed Forces. Even though it was not a high 
priority on his agenda, the issue warranted media attention 
because the Democrats were fiercely split on the President's 
position and it was easily explained in a headline or sound 
bite.
One of the most en^hatic antagonists of lifting the ban 
was Senate Armed Services Ccxnmittee Chairman Sam Nunn. He 
"took on the newly elected president of his party vocally and 
publicly; for doing so, he received an enormous amount of 
media a t t e n t i o n . H o w e v e r ,  Representative Ron Dellums,
Nunn's counterpart in the House, supported the President but 
received nowhere near the attention Nunn's vigorous 
opposition did. Dellums complained, "If you read the paper.
I'm not even there."is
Eventually President Clinton backed down, opting instead 
to allow homosexuals to serve as long as they concealed their 
sexual preference (a policy known as "don't ask don't tell").
By doing so he impaled himself on a double-edged political 
sword. Adversaries tabbed Clinton a liberal, gay rights 
supporter, while gay activists accused him of failing to keep
Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively," 101.
15 Jim Naureckas, "Ask Not What Gays Will Do to the 
Military —  Ask What the Military is Doing to Gays," in Jim 
Naureckas and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader; An 
Extra1 Review of Press and Politics in the 90's (Boulder, 
Co.: Westview Press Inc., 1996), 169.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
a campaign pr o m i s e . N e i t h e r  of these themes would play well 
during the battle over health care reform.
More controversy arose frcwa another of Clinton's 
campaign pledges : to appoint an administration that "looked
like America." In April, 1993, Clinton nominated Lani 
Guinier, an African-American female and personal friend of 
the Clintons, to head the Justice Department's Civil Rights 
division. Her nomination "became a lightning rod for 
political conflict."17 At the time she was a University of 
Pennsylvania Law Professor, but she had also worked for the 
Carter administration and for the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund. During her career, Guinier had written 
many scholarly articles advocating minority voting rights, 
increasing black representation and intensifying minority 
group participation in legislative bodies. 18
Much of the nation was introduced to Ms. Guinier in a 
April 30, 1993 opinion-editorial by Clint Bolick, entitled 
"Clinton's Quota Queens." Bolick contended that Guinier's 
appointment represented a Clinton payback to "extreme left- 
wing elements." According to Bolick, her scholarly works 
showed that she had an "in-your-face civil rights agenda"
Graham K. Wilson, "The Clinton Administration and 
Interest Groups," in Campbell and Rockman, The Clinton 
Presidency, 223.
David M. O'Brien, "Clinton's Legal Policy and the 
Courts : Rising from Disarray or Turning Around and Around?,"
in The Clinton Presidency, Campbell and Rockmann , 130.
18 Ibid.
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that would "further polarize an already divided nation.
Newsweek columnist George Will echoed Bolick's concern, 
accusing Guinier of believing that "the Voting Rights Act is 
violated by any legislative body where measures favored by 
certain government-approved minorities are often defeated."20 
Unfortunately, Bolick and Will, like much of the 
mainstream press, were guilty of selectively reading 
Guinier^s work. She had also written that empowering 
minorities at the polls did not "require legislative set- 
asides, color-coded ballots, electoral quotas or ^one black, 
two votes' remedies."21 Unfortunately, the damage had been 
done. The catchy phrase "quota queen" caught on, and the 
racially loaded term was often used by journalists referring 
to Ms. Guinier. It ccxabined the "welfare queen" stereotype 
with "quota," a term President Bush grappled with prior to 
the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.22 All of this did 
not deter George Will from suggesting that Guinier's 
nomination was "just another day in the 'reinvention of
Clint Bolick, "Clinton's Quota Queens," Wall Street 
Journal, 30 April 1993, 12(A).
20 George Will, "Sympathy for Guinier," Newsweek, 14 
June 1993, 78.
21 Lani Guinier, "Keeping the Faith: Balck Voters in 
the Post-Reagan Era," Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties 
Law Review, 24 (Spring 1989): 393.
22 Rob Richie and Jim Naureckas, "Lani Guinier: Quota 
Queen or Misquoted Queen?," in Naureckas and Jackson, The 
Fair Reader, 133.
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government' by a 'New Democrat'.... Next this lot will 'fix' 
the economy and 'reform' the health care system. Hang on."23 
Will's warning to "hang on" may have evoked images of a 
wild ride yet to come, but it was also ironic considering 
that on May 19, 1993 the seven-person staff of the White 
House travel-office was fired due to allegations of 
wrongdoings. The office is in charge of scheduling charter 
flights for the White House Press Corps who accompany the 
President on official duties, and for making hotel 
reservations for Executive aides. Members of the office were 
under FBI investigation for embezzling some eighteen-thousand 
dollars. During the investigation it was discovered that 
Harry Thomason, a friend of the Clintons and Hollywood 
producer, was trying to gain some of the airline charter 
business for his friends. At the same time, travel-office 
employee Catherine Cornelius, a distant cousin of the 
President, had proposed that the office be reorganized with 
herself as its head. In the mainstreaun press, these stories 
became know as "Travelgate."24
Since the travel-office provided "first-class creature 
comforts ... to reporters on presidential trips," any change 
in its personnel was sure to affect the professional lives of
23George Will, "Sympathy for Guinier," 78.
24 George J. Church, "Flying Blind," Time. 7 June 1993, 
28., and Eleanor Clift and Mark Miller, "Don't Mess With the 
Media: The White House press corps gets its revenge,"
Newsweek, 7 June 1993, 23.
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the White House Press C o r p s .25 ABC journalist Brit Hume 
voiced his dissatisfaction a few weeks after the shakeup by 
asking why the press had been served cold food on a recent 
White House charter flight, "a mere croissant, yogurt, and 
fruit."26 Not long after, there were one-hundred-sixty-nine 
questions about Travelgate during a White House press 
briefing, "far more than there were about the prospects for 
the president's $246 billion tax bill...."27
The press's antipathy for the Clinton-way of doing 
things segued into their antipathy for the health care reform 
process. In early May, 1993, Ira Magaziner and First Lady 
Hillary Clinton wanted to finish the health care proposal and 
send it on to Congress. However, most of the White House 
staff wanted nothing to distract attention, primarily media 
attention, from the battle for the President's budget 
proposal on Capital Hill. Eventually the First Lady agreed 
to exclude the press from the health care task force 
meetings. She recalled how she had been badly criticized by 
the press during the 1992 campaign and she did not want the 
same to happen to either the President's budget or health 
care reform. She justified the press lockout in an April,
1993 speech, "the bane of all people in political life ... is 
the unfair, unjust, inaccurate reporting that goes on from
25 Stanley W. Cloud, "Clinton vs. the Press," Time, 7 
June 1993, 27.
25 Clift and Miller, "Don't Mess With the Media," 23. 
27 Ibid.
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coast to coast."28 According to journalists Haynes Johnson 
and David Broder, the secrecy policy was a major mistake that 
"ultimately deprived the public of essential information on 
which to form judgments," and created a "cloud of public 
suspicion."29
Locking out the press lead to a number of damaging, and 
often misleading, leaks. One of the more serious incidents 
concerned three charts detailing three reform options. The 
first outlined the projected inflationary effect each of the 
three plans would have on national spending, the highest 
being an initial increase of fifty-billion dollars which 
would eventually increase to one-hundred-billion. The second 
chart depicted the potential savings that each option would 
gain, and the third estimated the net effect of each option 
on the federal budget. Johnson and Broder claim that only 
the first chart —  regarding the increasing costs of 
Clinton's reform ideas —  was leaked to the New York Times.
To ccanpound this breach, the chart was modified, making it 
appear to call for a one-hundred-fifty-billion dollar 
increase in taxes. A footnote which stated "in unmistakeüsle 
uppercase letters" that projected cost increases were "before 
any calculation of savings" had been blacked out.30
28 As cited by Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The 
System; The American Wav of Politics at the Breaking 
Point,(Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 137, 140.
29 Johnson and Broder, The System, 140, 142.
30 Ibid., 140-141.
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Without access to the footnote, or consulting the other 
two charts, the May 3 edition of the New York Times ran a 
critical front page headline: "HEALTH-CARE COSTS MAY BE
INCREASED $100 BILLION A YEAR." The article, by Robert Pear, 
lacked an in-depth analysis of the reasoning behind 
increasing expenditures or the benefits increased investments 
might bring about. Pear also maintained that some Clinton 
administration officials were urging their budgetary experts 
to reduce the cost estimates because the increases would be 
politically impossible to a c h i e v e . T h i s  insight suggests 
that he relied on more than the one chart to write his 
article. Of course, writing about the embattled 
administration's balanced approach to health care reform —  
which was revealed by the missing charts, and the lost 
footnote —  would not have landed his story on the front page 
of one of the nation's leading newspapers.
In fact, the accusation that there was a shroud of 
secrecy around the task force implies that it was some sort 
of conspiracy, which it was not. Nor is Johnson and Broder's 
contention that this somehow deprived the public of essential 
information and created a cloud of public suspicion 
completely accurate. The task force actually went out of its 
way to hear a variety of interests on matters of substance.
Only four months into Clinton's term, the task force had 
already met with 572 organizations. The headline on the May 
twenty-second issue of the Congressional Quarterly read
31 Robert Pear, "Health Care Costs May be Increased $100 
Billion a Year," New York Times, 3 May 1993, 1(A).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
"CLINTON TASK FORCE ALL EARS ON THE SUBJECT OF OVERHAUL." In 
September, when Hillary Clinton testified on behalf of health 
cêure reform before five congressional committees, "not a 
single legislator complained about the 'closed' or 
'secretive' deliberations: not Bob Dole, not Robert
Packwood, not John Danforth ... Republican Senators who all 
later came out against the bill."32
Despite consulting many organizations and a lack of 
conspiratorial assertions from legislators, journalist Dana 
Priest, who covered the task force for the Washington Post, 
continued to suggest that the Clintons "hurt themselves a 
lot, because the idea formed that they were creating a 
'secret plan. "'33 More pointed accusations came from radio 
talk show host Rush Limbaugh who professed that "anybody who 
disagrees with any aspect of [the Clinton] plan is being 
attacked. "34
Part of the problem is that there are inherent problems
with detailed press coverage. With an almost concessionary
tone, Johnson and Broder admit that
[I]t was a story that required detailed, 
persistent, imaginative coverage for people to 
understand how it affected them ... For the print 
press, which should have had more time to prepare 
longer in-depth articles, it was ... a challenging 
assignment to help the public understand the stakes 
involved and to sort out fact from propaganda in 
the political battle for public opinion,... Too 
often the print press failed to meet the challenge;
32 Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 28
33 Johnson and Broder, The System, 142.
34 Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
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coverage was desultory, inconsistent, or focused on 
the political points being scored by opposing 
sides.... For television, by nature a fragmentary 
medium for conveying information, with increasing 
emphasis on entertainment as news and "sound bites" 
featuring conflict, charge, and countercharge as 
news highlights, this story was nearly
impossible. 35
The closed door policy did make these inherent 
complications worse because it excluded the one group that 
mattered the most, the press. Despite their importance, 
veteran journalist James Fallows contends that even if 
keeping out the Washington Press Corps was a "stupid" idea it 
far from justified journalists depicting the task force as 
being a secret organization, a naive collection of liberal 
intellectuals or a closed-minded group of elites.36 
Essentially, the decision to keep the press at bay during the 
early stages of policy formation did not warrant the media 
misrepresenting reality.
Misleading depictions did not end after the task force 
had finalized their reform proposal. As mentioned above, 
journalistic accounts interwove anti-government themes, such 
as the shroud of secrecy, and the administration's closed- 
minded approach, with liberal accusations, portraying the 
Clinton health package as "a regulatory rat's nest," and 
"overambitious social engineering."37 Thus, to many the 1993 
Health Care Security Act became the left-wing reform plan.
35 Johnson and Broder, The System, 143.
36 Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 29.
37 Ibid., 32.
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This was perpetuated by media content that practically 
excluded advocates of a Canadian-style, single-payer health 
care system, a more liberal solution than President 
Clinton's.
As mentioned in chapter one, the Clinton team steered 
away from a single-payer proposal, even though eighty-nine 
House Democrats had already signed on the bill sponsored by 
Representative McDermott.38 The administration wanted to 
maintain Clinton's image as a "New Democrat" and they feared 
that opponents could easily portray a single-payer proposal 
as an unnecessary federal takeover of health care that would 
increase the national debt.
The strategy was intended to satisfy two related ends.
First, it was supposed to create a compromise position, 
situated between full-fledged socialized medicine and the 
present free market system. Second, by starting with a 
compromise the Clinton administration hoped that the package 
would avoid being labeled a big government program proposed 
by a tax-and-spend, liberal Democrat. The administration did 
not foresee that the nature of the plan, with its intricate 
and interlocking regulations, would give "right-wing 
government haters" adequate ammunition to contend that it 
would only increase taxes, create an unnecessary, intrusive 
governmental bureaucracy and destroy "the best health care 
system in the w o r l d .  "39 For the most part, the media
38 Johnson and Broder, The System, 43.
39 Skocpol, Boomerang. 178.
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exacerbated this reaction by marginalizing advocates of a 
single-payer health care reform package.
The quieting of these dissenting opinions perpetuated 
the liberal myth. Even while media content was failing to 
represent all sides of the health care debate, members of the 
media championed America's pluralistic system. On PBS's 
"MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour," anchor Margaret Warner proclaimed 
that "interest groups on all sides of the issue have taken to 
the a i r w a v e s . "40 in reality, an advertisement supporting a 
single-payer system, funded by the interest group Neighbor to 
Neighbor, was kept off television stations in San Francisco, 
Boston, and Washington D.C.41
The ad depicted a living room setting, with an elderly 
woman sitting in her easy chair next to a fire. As the 
camera zoomed in, the woman spoke tenaciously, "Listen, why 
don't we get rid of the health insurance companies. Let's go 
to the blackboard." Using her walking cane as a pointer,
"Here's what we spend on health care. It's a lot!" She 
directs the viewers attention to the board:
Single-Payer 
$900 Billion
Jeff Cohen and Norman Solomon, Through The Media 
Looking Glass; Decoding Bias and Blather in the News 
(Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), 86.
41 Ibid.
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"But if we get rid of the insurance companies, we can have 
complete coverage for everyone for the same money." The 
graphic on the board changes:
Insurance Companies 
$900 Billion 
+ $100 Billion
Sales Tax 
Benefits Tax 
Payroll Tax
"Any plan that keeps these guys in business will cost 
billions in taxes, taxes, taxes. To me it's a no-brainer." 
The ad closed by picturing the words "Health Insurance 
Companies," encircled and slashed through in red. A deep, 
forewarning, male voice cautioned, "It's time for them to go. 
Call Congress today."42
Kathleen Hall Jamieson contends that the reason this 
single-payer ad never "saw the light of day" was because 
health insurers brought pressure against those wanting to run 
them.
Insurance Agencies are major advertisers— . They can 
put economic pressure on stations not to air ads such as 
this and because those ads aren't protected legally, 
[insurance agencies] can threaten lawsuits against 
stations who air them, saying they are misleading. Now 
what that means in the debate is that this ad which says 
lets get rid of insurance companies won't air but —  
ads for the insurance industry [will air].... That means 
we have incentives, that are legal incentives inside the 
system, for large corporations to be given access to the
42 Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
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airwaves and those who oppose them not, and that is a
problem if one believes in balanced debate.43
The reasons given by station managers for not airing the 
single-payer ad confirms Jamieson's contention. They claimed 
that the ad was "a call to action," "too broad," and 
"undocumented." One even explained that running the ad would 
be prohibitive because many of their major advertisers are 
health insurers, and "we don't want to take any hits from 
the insurance c o m p a n i e s ."44 of course, stations did not 
routinely turn down ads from the health insurance 
corporations for the same reasons, because that would have 
directly cut revenues.
To make matters worse, news programming rarely mentioned 
a single-payer alternative. For instance, in all of 1993,
ABC's "World News Tonight with Peter Jennings" mentioned the 
proposal only once.45 when a Canadian single-payer health 
care system was discussed it was likely to be discarded 
without question. From July, 1993, to November, 1994, the 
proposal was referred to only twice on ABC's "Nightline."
One of these occasions was a featured interview with 
President Clinton. Anchor Ted Koppel suggested to the 
President that many Canadians were coming to the United 
States for health care. According to Koppel, America's 
northern neighbors were saying, "Whatever you do, don't
86.
Ibid.
Cohen and Solomon, Through The Media Looking Glass, 
45 Ibid., 85.
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exchange what you've got for what we've got." Actually, a 
Gallup poll taken a few days earlier had shown that only two 
percent of Canadians preferred the American health care 
system to their o w n . 46 Koppel had also overlooked that 
Representative McDermott's single-payer proposal had gained 
the support of eighty nine members of the H o u s e . 47
By marginalizing single-payer advocates the media 
effectively disqualified one solution to the debate. Even 
though the press might have easily explained how a Canadian- 
type system would reduce bureaucracy, cut costs, provide 
universal coverage, and still allow patients to choose their 
own doctors, they rarely discussed it.48 Ironically, these 
ingredients are what much of the American public wanted from 
health care reform.49
However, a single-payer plan went against those voices 
in the debate with the ability to speak the loudest, namely, 
the majority of the health insurance industry. Thus, members 
of the media, who might have considered discussing the plan 
seriously, could have lost credibility if they had done so.
They could have been accused of a liberal media bias and of 
championing a socialist health care system. Thus, most of 
the media chose to zero in on the Clinton proposal, which
46 "Nightline," March 1, 1994 as cited by Jim Naureckas 
and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader: An Extra! Review
of Press and Politics in the 90's (Boulder, Co.: Westview
Press Inc., 1996), 169.
Johnson and Broder, The System, 43.
48 Skocpol, Boomerang. 178.
49 Johnson and Broder, The System. 632-633,
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effectively edited a great deal of the debate because many 
House Members had already signed on to a single-payer bill.so 
The single-payer advocates were lost in the fray and the 
American public was left uninformed about one workable 
solution to health care reform.
For all practical purposes, the exclusion of the single­
payer proposal created a contextual void in media content.
Since journalists often narrow policy debate to political 
dichotomies, they needed a "liberal" plan. Considering that 
many of the established members of the media had a growing 
animosity for the administration, many of them had little 
problem characterizing "the Clinton Plan" as the "liberal" 
alternative. If single-payer advocates would have been given 
the same media time that antagonists of Clinton's plan were 
allotted, then the liberal myth would not have gained such 
distinction.
Thus, a full-blown media myth was born, as basic truths 
were edited. The Health Security Act of 1993 was not cooked 
up by Hillary Clinton and her liberal cronies, rather it was 
adapted from a managed competition blueprint drawn up by the 
representatives of the "Big Five" insurance companies —
Aetna, Cigna, Metropolitan Life, Prudential and Travelers.
One of the representatives noted that the only way to avoid a 
government takeover of health care, and avoid a Canadian 
style-system, was to eliminate the present multiple-payer
50 Ibid., 43.
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private insurance industry, and replace it with a system of 
managed competition.si
However, the "Big Five" had already begun forming Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), an essential ingredient to 
the President's proposal, and they were assured a major role 
in a health care system founded on a business-government 
partnership. Members of the Health Insurance Association of 
America (HIAA), which consisted of small to medium-sized 
health insurers, were not so confident. They feared that 
"managed competition" would manage them out of business, or 
that they would at least lose more of their business to the 
"Big Five."52
HIAA's response was to produce flak —  a multi-million 
dollar media campaign against Clinton's health care reform. 
Their most effective weapon was a series of now infamous 
advertisements known as the "Harry and Louise" ads. The next 
chapter, "Mountain of Misinformation: The Media and Anti­
reform Flak," concentrates on the producers of flak. As 
Skocpol notes, anti-reform flak spread "from think tanks to 
popular media and from elites to groups with a geographically 
dispersed grassroots presence."53
51 Cohen and Solomon, Through The Media Looking Glass. 
84-85.
52 Ibid.
53 Skocpol, Boomerang, 146.
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CHAPTER 3
MOUNTAIN OF MISINFORMATION: 
THE MEDIA AND ANTI-REFORM FLAK
Opponents to health care reform used flak as a way of 
"playing on, and intensifying, public distrust of 
government," and too often their propaganda, accurate or not, 
went unadulterated.! The following assesses the influence of 
two sources of flak during the health care debate —  
political advertisements, and radio talk shows —  and how 
they influenced media content. However, this flak was not, 
as Herman and Chomsky would contend, a pure function of elite 
propaganda which kept the media in line.2
Flak during the health care debate occurred in the 
context of what David Truman termed a "political 
disturbance," or an identifiable event that challenges the 
status quo and compels those adversely affected into action.3 
Health care reform threatened many established business 
interests and health care providers. They responded by
1 Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System: The 
American Wav of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 92.
2 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturinq 
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1988), 26-28.
2 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: 
Knopf, 1951), 88.
43
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producing political advertisements critical of the plan, and 
their accusations were often reinforced by conservative talk 
radio. These forms of propaganda were intended not only to 
sway public opinion but also to sway the opinion of 
legislators and members of the media. Often, advertisers and 
talk radio hosts would appeal to public doubts about the 
ability of government to solve the health care problem. Such 
appeals contributed to a level of confusion and mistrust 
surrounding President Clinton and his reform package.
Kathleen Hall Jamieson suggests that advertising and 
talk radio exemplified the larger problems with the health 
care debate itself. One could often trace the lines of 
political propaganda from the Republican National Committee, 
or a conservative interest group in Washington, to talk show 
host Rush Limbaugh, or to the editorial page of the Wall 
Street Journal, or even back through the c i r c u i t . 4 Whether 
or not these lines of rhetoric were intended is debatable.
What is important is that their similarities hindered the 
public's ability to hear multiple sides of the debate. The 
average citizen had "no way to say yes I favor this over 
that, or say I've heard all the arguments ... and I don't 
think any of them solve the overarching problem. "5
Although reform opponents may have played on the 
public's cynicism, they were not highly effective in changing
^ The Great Health Care Debate, part of The Moyers 
Collection, (Princeton: Films for the Humanities and
Sciences, 1994). videotape, and Johnson and Broder, The 
System, 197.
5 Ibid.
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the type of health care package the public demanded. As the 
Wall Street Journal-NBC news poll cited in Chapter Two shows, 
forty-five percent of the public had turned against the 
President's proposal but seventy-six percent continued to 
demand its essential elements when they were not connected to 
"the Clinton Plan."6
However, political advertisements and talk radio did 
influence key decision makers. In a 1995 survey commissioned 
by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, prominent members 
of both Houses of Congress were questioned about the 
influential factors leading to the demise of health care 
reform. Responding to the question, "In your opinion, did 
each of the following have a great deal, seme, not very much, 
or no influence on the outcome of the congressional debate on 
health care reform?," fifty-five percent said that 
advertising by interest groups had a great deal of influence 
and thirty-six percent said it had some i n f l u e n c e . 7
When asked, "Of the media sources, which specific one or 
two do you believe had the most influence in the outcome of 
the health care debate?," the number one response was radio 
talk shows, cited by forty-six percent of the respondents, 
and most of them specifically mentioned Rush Limbaugh. The
^ Hilary Stout, "Many Don't Realize It's the Clinton 
Plan They Like," Wall Street Journal. 10 March 1994, 1(B) and 
6(B).
7 Orval Hansen and others, eds., "Lawmakers' Views on 
the Failure of Health Reform: A Survey of Members of
Congress and Staff," Journal of Health Politics, Policv and 
Law 21, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 142.
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second closest response was newspapers, with thirty-eight 
percent (fifteen percent going to the New York Times, eleven 
percent to the Wall Street Journal, and four percent each to 
the Washington Post, the Washington Times and the Los Angeles 
Times).8
Influencing the decision making process was what many 
special interests set out to do. The HIAA's executive 
president, Willis Gradison Jr., had an insider's view of how 
his group could be successful. Gradison had served as a 
member of the House for eighteen years and had become an 
influential voice for the minority party on the Ways and 
Means Committee, and its Health Subcommittee. In 1992, after 
the moderate Republican lost election to a minor leadership 
post in the House Republican caucus, he decided to leave the 
House. Soon thereafter he accepted a post as president of 
the HIAA.9
The HIAA developed a series of advertisements popularly 
known as the "Harry and Louise" ads. Ben Goddard, the 
producer of the ads, admits that the HIAA targeted a certain 
audience, "We bought time on CNN and Headline News, CNBC,
Rush Limbaugh, and in New York, Washington, and Los Angeles.
We wanted to get on the agenda of the national media ... 
where editors and reporters who decide the news live."lo
8 Ibid., 145.
^ Johnson and Broder, The System, 53, 69, 198-199.
^8 Darell M. West, Diane Heith and Chris Goodwin, "Harry 
and Louise Go to Washington: Political Advertising and
Health Care Reform," Journal of Health, Politics, Policv and 
Law, (Spring 1996): 43.
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Many other advertisers followed HIAA's strategy. As Jamieson 
notes, roughly twenty-five percent of the country received 
concentrated advertising attention, "and those people were in 
the key districts of the members of the major committees that 
were going to act on health care legislation.
HIAA's first ad began with a younger couple sitting at 
their kitchen table covered with loose papers, a couple of 
note pads, and a calculator. A pencil in his right hand, the 
man taps at the calculator with his left. The woman, wipes 
her brow, and exclaims, "This was covered under our old 
plan." The man replies, "Oh yeah, that was a good one wasn't 
it." A foreboding voice chimes in, "Things are changing, and 
not all for the better. The government may force us to pick 
from a few health care plans designed by government 
bureaucrats." The actors respond. Woman: "Having choices
we don't like is no choice at all." Man: "They choose."
Woman: "We lose." The man brakes his pencil in half, and
the woman scratches her head as the camera zooms out. The 
narrator concludes, "For reforms that protect what we have 
call toll free. Know the facts. If we let the government 
reform health care, we lose."i2
This first installation of the HIAA's advertisements 
began running before the President even presented the Health 
Security Act to a joint session of Congress on September 22,
The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
12 Ben Goddard, "Changes Alternate #2," (Claussen/First 
Tuesday productions, 1993), video recording obtained from the 
Health Insurance Association of America.
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1993. Whether or not the HIAA had access to one of the 
leaked copies of the President's proposal is unknown.
However, it is important to recognize that the "Harry and 
Louise" ads quickly got the attention of other adversaries of 
"the Clinton Plan." As noted in the New York Times, the 
HIAA's advertising campaign "quickly attracted the ire of 
competing special interest groups."13 Through the use of 
advertising, different adversaries began to accuse "the 
Clinton Plan" of various deficiencies, while offering no 
alternative proposals. Piece by piece, they took the plan 
apart, until there was nothing left. The press's attention 
to various advertising campaigns increased the potency of the 
attacks.
In fact, the press added to the HIAA's advertising 
campaign by actually giving the series its catchy name. The 
original script identified "Harry" and "Louise" as merely 
"He" and "She." Only after members of the press had obtained 
a copy of the script, which listed the two actors by name,
Harry Johnson and Louise Caire, did reporters write about the 
"Harry and Louise" ads, which is easier to report on than 
reporting about that young couple sitting at their kitchen 
table discussing the nation's health care problems. Without 
media coverage of the ads, Americans may never have discussed 
"Harry and Louise.
Clifford Kraus, "Lobbyist of Every Stripe Turning to 
Grass Roots on Health Care," New York Times, 24 September 
1993, 20(A).
14 Johnson and Broder, The System, 205.
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The second "Harry and Louise" ad appeared in November.
It also began with the couple sitting at their breakfast 
table. Harry, casually turning pages of his newspaper, says,
"Well, I'm glad the President is doing something about health 
care reform." Louise, flipping through a copy of the 
President's Health Security Act, replies, "He's right, we 
need it." Harry: "But some of these details." Louise,
yellow highlighter in hand: "Like a national limit on health
care?" She begins to highlight lines of the President's plan 
and explains, "The government caps how much spending on 
health care and says, 'that's it.' ... There's got to be a 
better way." A phone number appears on the screen, under the 
bold banner, "A Better Way to Reform. " The narrator 
concludes, "There is a better way to reform. Call this toll 
free number for the facts...."is
The HIAA's simple, cost-effective strategy —  to target 
certain members of the media and to target certain 
legislative districts —  had a rippling effect. According to 
Gloria Borger, of U. S. News and World Report, the ads played 
a big part in the psychological crossfire of the health care 
debate. In general, members of Congress are familiar with 
the power of television because most of them have used it in 
elections. They are also aware that special interest groups 
can easily use advertising against them. However, their 
attention to advertising can lead them astray because some
Ben Goddard, "Yes But II," (Claussen/First Tuesday 
productions, 1993), video recording obtained from the Health 
Insurance Association of America.
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campaigns may actually be ineffective, and "members can get 
conned if they believe the public is listening.
Borger believes that is exactly what happened during the 
health care debate. The "Harry and Louise" ads show how 
health care reform became a debate between elites, and not a 
conversation between the voters and their leaders. The 
advertisers stirred up Washington and the press stirred up 
the public. As Borger suggests, "Harry and Louise would just 
have been two more whiny yuppies had the media not taken up 
their lament."i?
The "Harry and Louise" ads were so feared by 
legislators, that former House Ways and Means Chairman Dan 
Rostenkowski negotiated with the HIAA to keep the ads out of 
the districts of two prominent ccxnmittee members. Since 
Gradison, HIAA's president, was a former member of the 
committee it is likely that there was a substantial amount of 
communication between he and Rostenkowski. Chuck Lewis of 
the Center for Public Integrity, suggests that not only is 
this metaphorical for the cozy relationship between the 
health industry and the federal government, but it also 
exhibits how effective advertising can be. Gradison was able 
to "bludgeon public policy in the direction of his industry.
Gloria Borger, "Stupid Advertising Tricks," U. S. 
News & World Report, 1 August 1995, 66.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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and he did so, in part, because he had been on the Ways and 
Means Committee and he knew Dan Rostenkowski very well.
Jamieson agrees with Lewis' and Borger's basic premise. 
The "Harry and Louise" ads were not necessarily effective as 
mass advertising, per se. If they were then "Harry and 
Louise" would have changed public opinion. Evidence suggests 
that they did not. Instead, Jamieson contends that they were 
effective as a public relations phenomenon —  in altering the 
decision making process —  primarily because the media 
imputed political pull to "Harry and Louise."
On the major networks, the ads received more than five- 
and-a-half minutes of free air time, and most of this covered 
HIAA's strategy or the ads' political potency, not the 
accuracy of the ads or how they contributed to solving the 
health care problem. In the print media, "Harry and Louise" 
were mentioned over seven-hundred times in newspaper 
articles, and the couple "got more headline space in the 
nation's major news papers than the Senate Majority leader or 
the Senate Minority l e a d e r ."20
Jamieson also recognizes that the press responded to how 
the administration retorted "Harry and Louise." Since press 
coverage is driven by conflict, attack and counterattack, the 
"real press attention" came when
Bill and Hillary Clinton started to attack [Harry 
and Louise]. The press gravitated toward the 
attack, [and] featured Harry and Louise as an
Great Health Care Debate, videotape. 
20 Ibid.
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important enemy of the Clinton plan ... they 
assumed because the Clintons were treating [the 
couple] as if they were a serious player, they must 
be and they must be highly effective. Key 
legislators accepted this press interpretation and 
acted on it.21
In November, 1993, Hillary Clinton rebutted the HIAA 
campaign and the insurance industry in a well publicized
speech. She began, "I know you've all seen the ads---
'There must be a better way' —  you've seen that right? What 
you don't get told in the ad is that it is paid for by 
insurance companies...."22 Newsweek journalist Jonathan Alter 
reported that the First Lady's "attack" was substantively 
accurate and he stressed the divisions between the First Lady 
and the HIAA. Quoting her, he wrote that the health industry 
has "brought us to the brink of bankruptcy," and they enjoy 
"being able to exclude people from coverage, because the more 
they can exclude, the more money they can m a k e . "23
As the First Lady positioned herself against the health 
insurance industry, a number of media reports fortified the 
perception that this was a battle between the White House and 
big business. For instance, one report by "NBC Nightly News 
With Tom Brokaw," began with Brokaw's introduction, "Hillary 
Rodham Clinton today launched a scathing attack on the health
21 Ibid.
22 Sam Husseini, "Hillary & Bill & Harry & Louise," The 
Nation, 13 December 1993, 732.
23 Jonathan Alter, "Go Ahead, Bust Some Chops," 
Newsweek, 15 November 1993, 34.
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insurance industry."24 During the story Washington 
correspondent Andrea Mitchell suggested that anonymous 
sources were telling her that the White House went after the 
HIAA because they "wanted a scapegoat. "25 CNN journalists 
also played the HIAA and the White House against one another.
One reporter stated that the administration is "involved in 
something close to an all-out war with the health insurance 
industry," and that "the White House would rather talk about 
insurance industry profits than the rosy assumptions on which 
its own plan is based."26
These examples exhibit a couple of interesting points 
about the media's coverage of the debate. The first is that 
media content depicting health care reform to be a battle 
between the Clintons and the health insurance industry is 
misleading. As noted, the plan was adapted from a managed 
competition blueprint drawn up by the "Big Five" health 
insurance companies —  Aetna, Cigna, Metropolitan Life,
Prudential and Travelers. The Clintons were not battling 
these members of the health insurance industry. In fact, 
this group had formed the Alliance for Managed Competition, 
and continued to back President Clinton's proposal. However, 
most journalists used terms such "the health insurance 
industry" freely without recognizing the divisions within the 
industry itself. Thus, the real debate emerged as a battle
24 As cited by Husseini, "Hillary & Bill," 732.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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between big health insurers and small health insurers, but 
many members of the media concentrated on the attack and 
counter attack's forged by the Clinton administration and the 
equivocal "health insurance industry."27
The second point is that media coverage concentrated on 
the attack and counterattack of the competing sides, even 
when journalists recognized the split between the larger and 
smaller health insurers. For example, Newsweek's Jonathan 
Alter suggests that the political strategy behind Clinton's 
approach was to divide and conquer the insurers, "The half- 
dozen big boys would back the plan because they stand to win 
one of the sweetest shared monopolies ever."28 However, the 
members of HIAA, who "wreak havoc on the system with mounds 
of paperwork and cherry picking (insuring only healthy people 
without 'preexisting conditions') would be driven o u t . "29
Alter also acknowledges that the HIAA was mistaken to 
suggest that "the Clinton plan" would limit a patient's right 
to choose a doctor, but he also contends that the "Harry and 
Louise" ads were no more "misleading than the average 
election-year spot. In fact, the industry's opening salvos 
were rather m i l d . . . . " 3 0  However, according to Alter, the 
First Lady was "smart to rip their heads off" because if
27 Husseini, "Hillary & Bill," 732
28 Alter, "Go Ahead," 34.
29 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
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health reform is to live, then the members of the HIAA "must
die. "31
The terminology used in these examples is frustrating if 
one is concerned about having a frank and open discussion 
about the problems of health care in the United States and 
possible ways to solve those problems. Phrases such as —  "a 
scathing attack," "wanting a scapegoat," "an all out war," 
"ripping their heads off," and "must die" —  lack context 
because they are used so freely. Unfortunately, they have 
also become characteristic of pack journalism, directed by 
free market pressures. Thus news outlets are not only 
providing news, they are also providing entertainment. As 
these pressures increase, the line between news and 
entertainment becomes increasingly blurred and, ironically, 
when sources of entertainment comment on matters of public 
policy they contribute to a mediated perception of reality 
for both the public and their decision makers.
Anti-reform themes were picked-up by two of CBS's 
prime time television programs. A scene on "Picket Fences" 
depicted the show's primary characters, a married couple, in 
the kitchen discussing the effects of health care reform on 
their family. The wife explained, "We have two sons who are 
very fragile right now —  emotionally, psychologically. This 
is a bad time for their father to get fired, and the Clinton
31 Ibid.
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health plan is going to cut my salary by thirty-percent. If 
we lose your income too...." 2̂
Another scene on "Northern Exposure" echoed the anti- 
Clinton sentiment but was set against the backdrop of an 
Alaskan saloon rather than a family's kitchen. A man sitting 
at the bar, reading a newspaper, bemoans, "Ah, national 
health insurance, here we go down the sinkhole of socialized 
medicine." The bartender responds, "Like in England." Man:
"Yeah, and look what wonders its done for them. How to flush 
an empire down the toilet." Jamieson suggests that it is not 
only difficult to rebut dialogue that is insinuated into 
prime time television but that this type of political 
commentary hindered the policy making process because it 
contributed to the public's negative perception of Clinton's 
proposal without offering preferable alternatives.33
Another form of flak that was difficult for the White 
House to rebut, and which perpetuated confusion about the 
Health Security Act, came from talk radio.34 This relatively 
new medium's most popular personality is Rush Limbaugh. The 
"bombastic" talk show host has become so popular and 
influential that when the Republicans gained control of 
Congress in 1995 they made Limbaugh an honorary member of the 
Republican freshman class. Limbaugh offered them some advice 
with editorial space given to him by the Wall Street Journal,
32Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
33 Ibid.
34 Johnson and Broder, The System, 570.
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"Never moderate your tone.... Never attempt to be liked by 
those you defeated."35
Limbaugh is considered by some to be one of the most 
influential commentators in A m e r i c a . 36 His daily broadcasts 
are on over six-hundred-fifty radio stations and two-hundred 
television stations received by an estimated twenty-million 
people each week. He has also appeared as a guest political 
commentator on ABC's "Nightline" and "This Week With David 
Brinkley;" NBC's "Today Show" and "Meet The Press;" and 
PBS's "MacNeil /Lehrer News hour." The New York Times, Los 
Angeles Times, Newsweek, and the Wall Street Journal have all
published his c o l u m n s . 37
Despite Limbaugh's bombastic style, these guest spots 
have not been token appearances. In fact, many leading 
journalists and politicians have lauded his contributions.
Tim Russert, Washington bureau chief for NBC and host of 
"Meet The Press," said of Limbaugh, "You have to give him 
credit —  he works hard at getting his facts straight."
William Bennett, former Secretary of Education, even 
described Limbaugh as "possibly our greatest living
American. "38
35 Ibid.
36 Steven Rendall, Jim Naureckas, and Jeff Cohen, The 
Wav Things Aren't; Rush Limbaugh's Reign of Error (New York: 
The New Press, 1995), 7.
37 Ibid, 7, 10.
38 Ibid., 10.
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However, during the health care debate Limbaugh's 
commentary tended to mock the Clinton administration's health 
care proposal, and to misrepresent the facts about the plan 
and the public's opinion of its essential elements. In 
effect, Limbaugh was a very influential channel for 
antagonists of reform. Evidence of his influence was seen 
when the administration organized a bus caravan to tour the 
country in support of health care reform, the buses were met 
by mobs of boisterous protesters largely organized by Rush 
Limbaugh and other conservative talk radio outlets.39 
Jamieson has found that those who relied on Rush 
Limbaugh as a primary source of news during the debate were 
actually the least informed about the basic facts of the 
country's health care system. For example, when asked,
"Which groups (the elderly, poor, middle class, etc.) are 
most likely to be uninsured?," they most often responded the 
elderly, all of whom are presently insured under Medicare. 
Ironically, Limbaugh listeners were also the most likely to 
say that they were better informed than other Americans on 
health care reform.40
A primary reason that people find it easy to rely on 
Rush Limbaugh is that he entertains them. During the health 
care debate he often made fun of the Clintons with humorous 
skits, songs and jokes. An example of this was the "Dr. 
Hilldare" skit aired on his radio show. The skit featured
Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
Al Franken, Rush Limbaugh is a Big Fat Idiot and 
Other Observations, (New York; Delacorte Press, 1996), 12.
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two characters that sounded like Bill and Hillary Clinton.
It began with a forewarning from the narrator, "She's a
doctor with a prescription for disaster.... She's Hillary
Clinton ... and she's Dr. Hilldare." The voice of a patient
says, "I don't know doctor. I tend to get heartburn after
eating spicy food." Dr. Hilldare would simply respond,
"Heart transplant." The narrator would begin again, "Dr.
Hilldare, she specializes in fixing things that aren't really
broken." A voice sounding like Bill Clinton's responds,
"Prosthetic hand replacement for a hangnail? I don't know if
I go along with that honey." Dr. Hilldare threatens, "You
know what happens when you question my judgment Willie."
Clinton's voice: "Ok, I'll get the scalpel." The narrator
concludes, "Dr. Hilldare, she wants to overhaul the best
health care system in the free world."4i
Beyond Rush Limbaugh's entertainment value, his
monologues were often scathing misrepresentations of
President Clinton's health care package:
Virtually no choice will exist for you if the 
Clinton plan passes, virtually none. It's full of 
things that [are] going to harm freedom. It's 
going to harm individuals. It's going to raise
costs What do [the Clintons], who claim to care
more than anybody else, done in their lives that 
gives them the qualifications to orchestrate, to 
write and to implement and then carry out such a 
massive undertaking.... Forget about the money for 
a minute. I'm talking about the lack of 
freedom.... You have to get permission from the 
government before you can do anything in regard to 
health care if this thing happens.42
The Great Health Care Debate, videotape. 
42 Ibid.
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Beyond the fact that Limbaugh is misleading —  Clinton's 
approach preserved fee-for-service medicine —  his 
accusations are effective because he avoided the complex 
language of health care debate. His language can be 
understood by anyone and it appeals to "primal fears."43 
Most Americans are not going to want a health care system 
that restricts freedom, harms individuals, or requires the 
patient to get governmental permission. During the debate. 
Democratic Senator Harris Wofford understood how Limbaugh's 
accusations appealed to fear, just as Senator Rockefeller had 
warned the President frcan the start. Wofford contends that 
Limbaugh's tirades might have prevented a compromise from 
being reached because there is a "temptation in what Rush 
Limbaugh represents and what a huge amount of people fear; 
that the government can't do anything right. It's fear and 
hostility."44
What makes Limbaugh even more effective is that his 
audience is basically a captive one. The twenty-million 
people he reaches each week do not hear any other point of 
view during his program. As Jamieson contends, Limbaugh 
often makes good points that could be debated by someone who 
disagrees with him. In a debate, the members of the audience 
could at least accept or reject Rush Limbaugh's arguments.
In his monologues, one does not get that o p p o r t u n i t y .45
43 Ibid.
44 Johnson and Broder, The System, 277.
45 The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
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Unfortunately, the news media often failed to question 
Limbaugh's depictions of the White House or the Clinton 
health care package when given the chance. One of these 
instances stemmed from the suicide of Vince Foster.
On July 20, 1993, Foster's body was found with a single 
bullet wound to the temple in Fort Marcy Park next to the 
Potomac River in Virginia. Notwithstanding the official 
conclusions of the investigation, murderous conspiracy 
theories became a staple on conservative talk radio. These 
accusations intensified when in December, 1993, the 
Washington Times reported that certain files had been removed 
from Foster's office on the night of his death. The files 
pertained to the Clintons' involvement in Whitewater, a 
private land development in Arkansas that had been the 
subject of ethical and criminal investigations since the 1992 
campaign. 46
On his March 10, 1994 broadcast, Limbaugh urgently 
announced, "Ok, folks, I think I got enough information here 
to tell you about the contents of this fax that I got. Brace 
yourselves.... [I]t is a bit of news which says ... Vince 
Foster was murdered in an apartment owned by Hillary Clinton, 
and the body was then taken to Fort Marcy Park (italics 
a d d e d ) . "47 Limbaugh had received this information from a 
newsletter put out by a Washington D. C. consulting firm.
46 Johnson and Broder, The System, 235, 260-261.
47 Jim Naureckas and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair 
Reader; An Extral Review of Press and Politics in the 90's. 
(Boulder, Co.: Westview Press Inc., 1996), 139.
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Not only did the newsletter state that the allegations were a
rumorf but it also stated that Foster had committed suicide
in an apartment owned by White House associates. It did not
state, as Limbaugh had broadcasted to millions, that Foster
had been murdered in an apartment owned by the First Lady. 48
On April 19, 1994, a special episode of ABC's
"Nightline" focused on the press's coverage of Whitewater.
Appearing as a special guest Limbaugh claimed, "Whitewater is
about health care."
Most people think that health care is a good idea, 
but they haven't read the plan. They're taking the 
President's word for it. Now I think if the 
President's word is what we are going to rely on 
for his policies ... and if people are going to 
base their support for the plan on whether or not 
they can take his word, I think it's fair to 
examine whether or not he keeps his word.... [A] 11 
of those things [i.e. Whitewater] that people are 
curious about are simply a window into whether or 
not [the Clintons are] telling falsehoods t o d a y . 49
There is nothing wrong with Limbaugh connecting questions 
about health care reform to questions about Clinton's 
character. However, Koppel did not question Limbaugh on why 
the relationship really mattered, in policy terms. How is it
48 Ibid., 140.
49 See Johnson and Broder, The System. 276-277; 
Naureckas and Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader, 139-141; and 
Theda Skocpol, Boomerang; Clinton's Health Security Effort 
and the Turn against Government in U. S. Politics (New York: 
W. W, Norton & Company, 1996), 213. It is important to note 
that Johnson and Broder treat this quote as if it occured 
during one of Limbaugh's radio broadcasts. Naurecks and 
Jackson, as well as Skocpol, explicitly state that Limbaugh 
made this statement during the interview on "Nightline."
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that "Whitewater is about health care?"50 Does their 
suspected involvement in unproven scandals disqualify the 
Clintons from being able to "orchestrate, to write and to 
implement and then carry out such a massive undertaking?"si 
When, on the same show, he was questioned about the 
false irumor of Vince Foster's death, Limbaugh claimed that he 
is not "a rumor-monger." The show's host, Ted Koppel did not 
question Limbaugh on this point, saying, "As I recall you 
didn't present it as accurate, did you? You represented it 
as one of the rumors that was going around." Producer, Jeff 
Greenfield added in another segment that Limbaugh had 
"broadcast the rumor as an example of the more wild stories 
circulating."52
The benevolent treatment that Limbaugh received from the 
news media helped to confuse the public's perception of the 
Health Security Act just as much as the press's charitable 
coverage of "Harry and Louise." This begs the question, 
asked by PBS's Bill Moyers, "Can we conduct public policy 
debates when the average Joe and Jane are confused?"
Jamieson's reply is simply no, and she contends that "the 
problem with this level of confusion is that it is very easy 
for advertising and for demagoguery to frighten people, and 
frighten them needlessly. "53 since most of the public did not
50 Ibid.
51 The Great Health Care Debate, Videotape.
52 Naureckas and Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader, 140.
53 The Great Health Care Debate. Videotape.
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really know what was in the President's plan to start with, 
flak only contributed to the public's c o n f u s i o n . 54
Despite Jamieson's conclusion, flak probably did more 
than just create confusion because the public also received a 
significant amount of policy information from these same 
s o u r c e s .55 since the press rarely provided an adequate 
discussion of policy matters, the opinions of the HIAA, Rush 
Limbaugh, and other sources of flak substituted as policy 
analysis. Even though these sources may have filled a "gap" 
in news coverage, a thorough, accurate description of health 
care reform requires more objective sources than political 
advertising or talk radio.
The following chapter, "No Exit: A Chart, A Scandal, and 
A Bus Tour," will focus on how the media strayed from policy 
analysis, concentrated on the surface aspects of the debate, 
and failed to probe or question various reform alternatives.
By not questioning flak and following the rest of the pack, 
most journalists did more that just reinforce the idea that 
"the Clinton Plan" was an unacceptable alternative. In the 
end, "the media failed in a historic way to help Americans 
understand and decide on this issue."56
54 Ibid.
55 Johnson and Broder, The System. 635
56 Ibid., 634,
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CHAPTER 4 
NO EXIT:
A CHART, A SCANDAL, AND A BUS TOUR
In 1994, better than sixty-percent of the newspaper 
articles on health care reform focused on either political 
strategies or public opinion polls rather than policy 
matters.1 The previous two chapters have illustrated that 
anti-government sentiment and flak exacerbated the news 
media's drift away from discussing matters of policy, and 
toward covering some of the debate's more superficial 
aspects. This chapter describes how this drift often 
manifested into various media feeding frenzies and, 
ironically, how pack journalism actually inspired anti-reform 
sentiment, and anti-reform flak.
As Larry Sabato explains, a feeding frenzy is a 
"political event or circumstance where a critical mass of 
journalists leap to cover the same embarrassing or scandalous 
subject and pursue it intensely, often excessively, and
1 Tom Hamburger, "Coverage on Health Care Confuses More 
Than it Clarifies," Minneapolis Star-Tirbune, 24 October 
1994; as cited by James Carville, We're Right, They're Wrong: 
A Handbook for Spirited Progressives (New York: Random
House, 1996), 114.
65
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sometimes uncontrollably."2 in particular, there were four 
political situations receiving such attention —  a flow chart 
of Clinton's plan published in the Wall Street Journal, the 
ongoing news coverage of Whitewater, an article entitled "No 
Exit" published in The New Republic, and the Reform Rider bus 
caravan in the summer of 1994. These examples symbolize how 
many members of the press became preoccupied with "gauging 
and guessing who would win" the debate on Capital Hill and 
"not in exploring what the consequences [of health care 
reform] would be for the country."3 As Haynes Johnson and 
David Broder suggest, this type of reporting is a product of 
the journalistic culture, "its professional mind-set and its 
commercial, competitive pressures."4
The news media is a business, it relies on standard 
sources of information. These include individuals such as 
government officials, academics, and other journalists, as 
well as groups such as think tanks, special interest groups, 
and other media outlets. Not only do these sources reduce 
investigative costs, but they are also presumptively accurate
2 Larry Sabato, Feeding Frenzy; How Attack Journalism 
Has Transformed American Politics. (New York: The Free
Press, 1991) 6.
2 Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System: The
American Wav of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 635.
4 Ibid., 634.
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and thus provide some protection against critics of media 
bias or those who threaten libel suits.5
In October, 1993, Republican Representative Dick Armey 
served as an established source of information for the Wall 
Street Journal. They published his opinion-editorial 
entitled "Your Future Health Plan," in which Armey claimed 
that the Clinton plan would "create 59 new federal 
programs ... expand 20 others, impose 79 new federal mandates 
and make major changes in the tax code."6 Accompanying his 
letter was an extensive flow chart and glossary. The chart 
depicted a vast array of arrows darting between some forty 
boxed acronyms, and the glossary briefly described each of 
them. Armey contended, "this flow chart makes it clear that 
the Clinton plan is a bureaucratic nightmare that will 
ultimately result in higher taxes, reduced efficiency, 
restricted choice, longer lines and a much bigger federal 
government."?
However, Theda Skocpol notes that a great deal of the 
chart illustrated the already existing web of government and 
private insurance bureaucracy. Nonetheless, variations of 
the chart "soon appeared on television, inspired cartoonists 
and humor columnists, and became a staple of conservative
5 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturinq 
Consent; The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1988), 18-25.
® Dick Armey, "Your Future Health Plan," Wall Street 
Journal, 13 October 1993, 22(A).
7 Ibid.
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attacks on the Clinton plan."8 Army's chart was even used by 
Senator Bob Dole in the Republican's nationally televised 
rebuttal of President Clinton's 1994 State of the Union 
Address.9
Essentially, the news media accepted the chart without 
questioning its accuracy, and thus gave anti-reform 
Republicans an opportunity to accuse Clinton's plan of being 
a "bureaucratic nightmare," as Armey had done in his letter 
to the Wall Street Journal. This theme became important 
because many Republicans believed that their party could 
regain the White House and take control of Congress if they 
could demonize the Clinton plan, and then defeat any 
compromise devised by congressional Democrats. This strategy 
was adamantly supported by the Project for the Republican 
Future and its chair, William Kristol. In a steady stream of 
memorandums to leading Republicans, Kristol argued for "the 
unqualified political defeat of the Clinton health care 
proposal."10 By January, 1994, Republicans began to follow 
Kristol's advice and openly adopt one of his favorite axioms,
"there is no health care crisis."H
® Theda Skocpol, Boomerang; Clinton's Health Security 
Effort and the Turn against Government in U. S. Politics (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 143-144.
9 Ibid., 144.
10 Ibid., 145-146.
11 Johnson and Broder, The System, 270.
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In Senator Dole's rebuttal to President Clinton's State
of the Union Address, he pointed to an Armey-esque chart to
support his argument against the Clinton plan:
Our country has health care problems, but not a 
health care crisis, but we will have a crisis if we 
take the President's medicine —  a massive overdose 
of government control.,.. More cost, less choice, 
more taxes, less quality, more government control 
and less control for you and your family —  that's 
what the President's government-run plan is likely 
to give you.... Let me point out some of the new 
bureaucracies that the President's plan will 
create. Way up here is the National Health Board.
Over here is the Advisory commission on Regional 
Variations of Health Expenditures.... Now you and I 
are way down here, way at the bottom. I don't know 
why we're not at the top, but we're at the bottom. 12
Strewn across the chart were terms such as "taxes," 
"regulation," and "drug-pricing scheme." As Johnson and 
Broder contend, "It was all negative ... all brilliantly 
effective. From then on, the chart became a centerpiece in 
Capital Hill debates. It further frightened a public already
suspicious of government "13
However, part of the reason the chart gained such 
notoriety is that the Republicans used it as an accusatory 
tool, and accusations make inherently dramatic media content 
that can create fear. Reporters naturally gravitate toward 
these types of conflict and, as Skocpol contends, this 
tendency was worsened because major media outlets assigned 
higher-profile political reporters to the debate. Since most
12 "Excerpts From the Republican's Response to the 
President's Message," New York Times, 26 January 1994, 15(A).
13 Johnson and Broder, The System. 270.
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of them were policy generalists, they often accentuated who 
was arguing with whom, and often failed "to help the public 
see the details of proposals or the validity of claims about 
them."14 Therefore, just as Armey's letter in 
the Wall Street Journal, Senator Dole's rebuttal went 
virtually unquestioned by the major media.
Instead, the New York Times, anticipating the 1996 
Presidential election, pitted Clinton's proposal against 
Dole's leadership. Its front page headline read, "Clinton 
Vows Fight for His Health Plan."is However, the article 
accurately noted that Clinton demanded universal health care, 
not necessarily the passage of his plan. Brandishing his pen 
at the members of Congress, the President stated, "If you do 
send me legislation that does not guarantee every American 
private health insurance that can never be taken away, you 
will force me to take this pen, veto the legislation, and 
we'll come right back here and start all over."is The Wall 
Street Journal also veered away from an analysis of Clinton's 
proposal or questioning Dole's accusations, noting that, "The 
President's threat to veto anything less than universal 
health coverage is a politically risky move ... [and] the
Skocpol, Boomerang. 128.
15 Gwen Ifill, "Clinton Vows Fight for His Health Plan," 
New York Times, 26 January 1994, 1(A).
15 Ibid.
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statement will thrill the left wing of the Democratic 
Party___
In describing the Republican response to Clinton's 
speech, the inner pages of the Times read, "Gone, at least 
for tonight, was the legislative Senator Dole, who often 
seeks compromise. Instead he was the combative, partisan 
leader ... sounding an electoral trumpet for November...." is 
The article did not probe Dole's accusations —  that 
Clinton's plan would cost more, provide less choice, increase 
taxes, lower quality, and give the government more "control." 
When the leading news agencies accepted his claims without 
question it created a wake of anti-reform themes throughout 
the mass media.
Notions about the "bureaucratic nightmare" even landed 
in the pages of the "world's most widely read magazine," 
Reader's Digest. I t ' s  March, 1994, cover read "YOUR RISK IN 
CLINTON'S HEALTH PLAN."20 The article began with a story 
about Donald Porter, a sixty-four-year-old Canadian who 
needed an expensive bone marrow transplant to treat his 
lymphatic cancer. However, "the government deemed him 'too 
old' for a transplant; younger people had a better chance of
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Michael K. Frisby, "Clinton 
Pledges That Crime and Welfare Issues Will Get Near-Equal 
Billing with Health Care," Wall Street Journal, 26 January 
1994, 16(A).
Adam Clymer, "In G.O.P. Response to Clinton, Dole 
Denies There is a 'Crisis' in Health Care," New York Times, 
26 January 1994, 15(A).
19 Skocpol, Boomerang. 148.
20 Reader's Digest. March 1994.
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s u r v i v a l . "21 so Porter decided to sell his house, take out 
all of his savings and come to the United States for the 
operation. Now his cancer is in remission. When the 
Canadian system failed him. Porter came to the United States, 
the one industrialized country that does not have universal 
medical coverage but, according to Reader's Digest, the one 
that does have the highest standard of health care in the 
world. 22
Even though human interest stories can be effective in 
explaining difficult policies to the public, the Reader's 
Digest story was more likely to misinform. Since the United 
States ranks in the lower tier of industrialized nations in 
life expectancy and infant mortality rate, it may not 
necessarily be true that the country has the highest standard 
of health care in the w o r l d . 23 Moreover, the article was 
about the ills of a Canadian-style, single-payer health care 
system. It neither mentioned that Clinton had rejected this 
approach, nor clarified that the Health Security Act was a 
managed care proposal- Instead, the article featured large 
print abstracts that could have come straight from Armey's 
letter, from Kristol's strategy memos, from Dole's response 
to the President's State of the Union address, or even from 
Rush Limbaugh or the HIAA:
21 Ralph Kinney Bennet, "Your Risk Under Clinton's 
Health Plan," Reader's Digest, March 1994, 127.
22 Ibid.
23Steven Rendall, Jim Naureckas, and Jeff Cohen, The Wav 
Things Aren't; Rush Limbaugh's Reign of Error (New York:
The New Press, 1995), 120.
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Rhetoric to the contrary, the Clintons must know 
this plan will result in rationing.
The plan would actually increase costs and tax many 
jobs and businesses out of existence.
Quality will be a forgotten concept.
They are taking away our choice of doctor.24
The vernacular of these accusations is most striking —  
"ration," "tax," "quality," "choice." The former two are 
inherently negative and appeal to anti-government sentiment, 
while the latter are terms Clinton had used positively which 
adversaries turned against him. Moreover, these accusations 
were easily connected to questions about the character of 
Clinton, his administration, the First Lady, and how little 
the public trusted them.
Given the intricate nature of the President's proposal, 
support for his plan would have to be based on the public's 
belief in his word. As explained by Rush Limbaugh, "if the 
President's word is what we are going to rely on for his 
policies ... it's fair to examine whether or not he keeps his
word "25 For many members of the public, the media's
intense focus on Whitewater (a late 1970's land deal in which 
the President and First Lady were involved), and other
24 Bennet, "Your Risk Under Clinton's Health Plan," 128-
131.
25 See Johnson and Broder, The System, 276-277; Jim 
Naureckas and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader; An 
Extra! Review of Press and Politics in the 90's. (Boulder, 
Co.: Westview Press Inc., 1996), 139.; and Skocpol,
Boomerang, 213.
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seemingly connected scandals gave them an answer —  no, the 
Clintons cannot be trusted.
On the night of December 19, 1993, CNN broadcast 
portions of an article entitled, "Living with the Clintons:
Bill's Arkansas Bodyguards Tell the Story the Press Missed," 
to be published in the American Spectator. The article 
presented the claims of two former Arkansas State Troopers 
that Clinton had numerous extramarital affairs while serving 
as Governor of Arkansas. 26 Two days later, the front-page of 
the Los Angeles Times read, "Troopers Say Clinton Sought 
Silence on Personal Affairs." The troopers described "a 
pattern of deception and indiscretions," and claimed that 
"Clinton, as president, sought to discourage them from 
speaking out by offering them federal jobs."27 These 
allegations were never proven, but it mattered little because 
"Troopergate" had been born. The media's attention to the 
troopers' accusations also refocused the press's attention on 
the Clintons' doings in Arkansas, especially their 
involvement in Whitewater. 28
The Clintons, along with their friends from Arkansas,
Jim and Susan McDougal# purchased two-hundred-and-thirty 
acres on the White River in Arkansas. After Clinton was 
elected Governor in 1979, the Whitewater Development
26 Johnson and Broder, The System, 255-256.
27 william C. Rempel and Douglas Prentz, "Troopers Say 
Clinton Sought Silence on Personal Affairs," Los Angeles 
Times, 21 December 1993, 1(A).
28 Johnson and Broder, The System, 256.
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Corporation was formed, incorporating the tract purchased 
with the McDougals. In 1982, McDougal acquired Woodruff 
Savings and Loan, changing its name to Madison Guarantee.
Two years later, the Federal Home and Loan Bank Board issued 
a report on Madison stating that, "Substantial profits from 
the service corporation on the sale of real estate owned have 
been improperly recognized ... as a result of contract sales 
and submarket interest rates. Correcting entries will 
adversely affect net worth and result in an insolvent
position."29
In 1985, the Rose Law Firm, where Hillary Clinton was a 
partner, represented Madison before the Arkansas Security 
Department, concerning their restructuring plan. That same 
spring, McDougal held a fund raiser to help pay Governor 
Clinton's 1984 campaign debt. Later, questions arose as to 
whether these funds were illegally diverted from Madison to 
the Clinton campaign. In 1989, Madison was closed by federal 
regulators, with an estimated loss of sixty-million dollars, 
and the McDougals were indicted on charges of bank fraud.30
Although most of this was known during the campaign, 
Whitewater was on the media's back burner during President 
Clinton's first year in office. Members of the press were 
busy reporting on "Travelgate," "Troopergate," and various 
other peccadilloes. So by the end of 1993 the press's 
disposition to interpret any hint of wrongdoing into full-
29 Johnson and Broder, The System, 259.
30 Ibid.
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fledged scandal had increased. In addition, Johnson and
Broder point out that, since Watergate, Americans have become
"conditioned to expect the worst from public officials.—
This preconception only worsens the effects of scandal-driven
press coverage, and it became only a matter of time before
Whitewater regained the media spotlight.
One week prior to the State of the Union Address, the
headline of the Washington Post's "National Weekly Edition"
read "WHITEWATER: More Questions Than A n s w e r s . "32 Below the
banner was a picture of a waving, jovial Bill and Hillary
Clinton, superimposed over headlines from other leading
newspapers (the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the
New York Times). Strewn across the page, the scathing
headlines surrounded the Clinton's photo, symbolizing a media
siege —  "Ever-Growing Paper Trail: Whitewater Records Go
from Nothing to Volumes," "On Arkansas, Sex, Not Inhaling,
and Whitewater," "A Special Council for Whitewater."33 The
Whitewater feeding frenzy was everywhere:
It seeped into conversations, leaped out in daily 
headlines, blared form television sets, boomed on 
radio talk show commentary, and became the subject 
of increasingly venomous conspiracy theories —  
about Vince Foster, the Clintons, the Rose Law 
Firm.... In one week in mid-March, at the peak of 
the press frenzy, the nation's seven largest 
newspapers published ninety-two Whitewater stories.
During that one month, the three TV networks aired 
one hundred twenty-six Whitewater stories. By 
comparison, from the first of the year to the end
Johnson and Broder, The System, 262
32 Ibid., 263.
33 Ibid.
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of March, the three networks aired one hundred 
seven stories on Bosnia, fifty-six on the Middle 
East, and forty-two on the health care debate.
More Whitewater newspaper stories were published in 
major papers than on the combined total of health 
care, welfare, and crime legislation.34
Therefore, media messages about Whitewater, health care 
reform, and all the President's troubles became increasingly 
intermingled. Representative Jim McDermott ccmipared them, 
especially Whitewater, to a smog hanging over the President's 
health care proposal, "At first you don't see it, then you 
do. It's subliminal. It saps your energy ... you can't help 
noticing it."35 Part of the smog was created by excessive 
negative media coverage, and that made it much easier for 
Kristol, Armey, Dole and many others to say "there is no 
health care crisis," while the press failed to question their 
claims. Over time, media content increasingly portrayed both 
the President and his health proposal to be fraudulent.
However, when the newly elected Speaker of the House, 
Newt Gingrich, reflected on the health care battle he pointed 
to another important episode which decided the fate of the 
President's proposal. It was an influential article that 
appeared in the February 7, 1994, edition of The New 
Republic, entitled "No Exit," by Elizabeth McCaughey.
Gingrich said it was "the first decisive break point ... They 
never recovered from her a n a l y s i s . "36 At the time of the
34 Ibid., 275.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 272.
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article, McCaughey was a virtually unknown intellectual at 
the conservative Manhattan Institute.3? According to James 
Fallows, the predominant view in Washington was that 
McCaughey, "with no ax to grind and no preconceptions about 
health care, sat down for a careful reading of the whole 
Clinton bill," and after discovering its true consequences,
"she felt it her duty to warn people about what the bill 
might mean."38
The article began, "If you're not worried about the 
Clinton health bill, keep reading ... you will have to settle 
for one of the low-budget health plans selected by the 
government. The law will prevent you from going outside the 
system to buy basic health coverage you think is better— ."39 
After each of her accusations, McCaughey cited page numbers 
of the bill, so anyone doubting her claims could look it up. 
However, most of the press did not question her accusations. 
Instead, her contention that the Clinton plan would adversely 
effect the quality of American's health care and hazardously 
transform one-seventh of the national economy was 
perpetuated. 40
McCaughey's claims were sustained by reactions from 
other members of the mass media. For example, Michael
37 See James Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 
Atlantic Monthly, 275 nl (January 1995): 32; Johnson and 
Broder, The System, 272; and Skocpol, Boomerang, 153.
38 Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 36.
39 Elizabeth McCaughey, "No Exit: What the Clinton plan
will do for you," The New Republic. 7 February 1994, 21.
48 Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 36.
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Kinsley, one of the nations leading left wing political 
commentators, referred to McCaughey as a "nightmare 
scenarist." At the seone time, he contended that health care 
reform is "a test of our capacity as a democracy to have an 
honest and sophisticated debate over an important public 
i s s u e . "41 Yet Kinsley's rebuttal was not a part of the very 
debate for which he called. He not only resorted to name 
calling, he also admitted to not having read the President's 
plan, giving credence to McCaughey's opening salvo, "If 
you're not worried about the Clinton health bill, keep 
reading...."42
Increasing the acceptability of McCaughey's claims were 
references to her analysis made by other media outlets such 
as the Wall Street Journal and Reader's Digest. Significant 
excerpts were also used by Newsweek's George Will. In a 
February editorial. Will opined, "it would be illegal for 
doctors to accept money directly from patients, and there 
would be 15-year jail terms for people driven to bribery for 
care they feel they need but the government does not deem 
n e c e s s a r y . "43 He backed his claims by citing McCaughey, "To 
see why support for the plan plummets as analysis of it
Michael Kinsley, "TRB From Washington: Second
Opinion," The New Republic, 14 February 1994, 44.
42 McCaughey, "No Exit," 21.
43 George Will, "The Clintons' Lethal Paternalism," 
Newsweek, 7 February 1994, 64.
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proceeds, see the analysis in The New Republic by Elizabeth
McCaughey of the Manhattan I n s t i t u t e . . . ."44
Claims such as these were simply false. The first
provision of the President's proposal stated:
Nothing in this Act Shall be construed as 
prohibiting the following;
(1) An individual from purchasing any health care 
services. 45
This was made clear when the Administration issued a full 
rebuttal to "No Exit." A copy was submitted to The New 
Republic but it was never published. Instead, they opted to 
publish another scathing piece by M c C a u g h e y . 46
McCaughey's contentions that the government would police 
the public's health care, and that one-seventh of the economy 
was going to be controlled by the federal bureaucracy, became 
the conventional wisdcan. In reality, people were not going 
to lose choice, nor would there be a significant economic 
shakeup. In fact, more than forty-percent of health care in 
America is already financed by the federal government. Under 
the Health Security Act, the other sixty-percent would 
continue to filter through most of the existing corporate 
bureaucracy it goes through n o w . 47
Ironically, McCaughey wound up not being the impartial 
voice she claimed to be. The same year her article was
44 Ibid.
45 Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinfomation," 32.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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published, she became the Republican nominee for Lieutenant 
Governor of New York, a race she later won. Evidently, "No 
Exit" gave McCaughey a springboard to her own political 
aspirations.48 This development, and her connection to the 
Manhattan Institute, leads Johnson and Broder to contend that 
McCaughey is a policy advocate, not a journalist. Thus, any 
suggestion that her article contributed to media content is 
misguided. 49
However, Johnson and Broder are overlooking an important 
factor. During the debate individuals such as Kinsley and 
Will, and news organizations such as The New Republic, the 
Wall Street Journal, and Reader's Digest, treated McCaughey 
as an accurate source. Therefore, the overall perception was 
that her accusations were precise. In effect, "No Exit" not 
only became a significant part of media content, it also fed 
the media's feeding frenzy. To dismiss McCaughey as "not a 
journalist" misses the point. The press's reaction to "No 
Exit" exhibited how press coverage can be driven by 
journalism's shortcomings. As Johnson and Broder themselves 
conclude;
The journalistic culture ... nudges the coverage 
strongly to emphasize conflict and dissent rather 
than clarification of alternatives and the search 
for consensus ... [during the debate] the press 
focus shifted from explanation of the problem and 
the proposed solutions to an emphasis on what might 
be called the mugging of the Clinton Plan ... the 
press was caught up quickly in gauging and guessing
See Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 32? Johnson 
and Broder, The System, 271-272; and Skocpol, Boomerang, 153.
49 Johnson and Broder, The Svstem. 634.
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who would win, not in exploring what the 
consequences would be for the country.so
By the summer of 1994, the press's feeding frenzy had 
peaked. At the same time the Administration decided to mount 
a public relations campaign with a bus tour across the 
country, tabbed the "Health Security Express." It was 
intended to take the positive message of health care reform 
to the people, and hopefully gain positive press coverage 
The plan backfired, badly, and a pack of journalists were 
there to report about it. At each stop the buses were met by 
fierce protesters, often outnumbering the supporters and 
waving signs with various anti-reform and anti-Clinton 
slogans, such as "Do you enjoy the compassion of the I.R.S. 
and the service of the Post Office ... if so, you'll love 
Government-Run Health Care!" si
The protesters fueled negative news coverage more than 
the positive intentions of the tour, and their presence was 
no coincidence. Newt Ginrich's Capital Hill office worked 
with other Senators and with special interests groups, such 
as the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) 
and Citizens for a Sound Economy (CSE), to derail the bus 
caravan. They obtained the tour's schedule and through the
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 460, 465.
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use of talk radio and local contacts they organized 
opposition to the President's plan.52
Essentiallyf the rallies became a battle to win media 
coverage. The NFIB organized small business owners to be 
available to the media at every stop, providing "real-life 
opinions." Likewise the CSE mailed out "scripts" to local 
talk radio programs along the route, urging listeners to 
demonstrate against the "Phony Express," calling it a "media 
stunt pushing government-controlled health c a r e ."53
All of this created exciting and politically combative 
news stories. Only two days into the tour the caravan began 
rescheduling stops. As reported in the Washington Post, they 
"were so concerned about protesters in Boise [Idaho] that 
they canceled their appearance at the planned health care 
rally on the steps of the state capitol."54 Three days later, 
as they pulled in to the Holiday Inn in North Platte,
Nebraska, they were met by staunch protesters, one 
proclaiming, "Bill and Hillary are immoral homosexual
^2 See The Great Health Care Debate, part of The Moyers 
Collection, (Princeton; Films for the Humanities and 
Sciences, 1994). videotape, and Johnson and Broder, The 
Svstem, 466.
53 Johnson and Broder, The Svstem, 467, It is also 
important to note; Johnson and Broder explain that CSE is 
"backed financially by Richard Mellon Scaife, an heir to the 
Pennsylvania Mellon bank and oil fortune ... (he also funds 
with] grants and gifts totaling $400,000 a week ... the 
Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute and the American 
Spectator magazine, a leading force in pushing the 
Whitewater/Vince Foster conspiracy theories," (p. 465)
54 Ibid., 463.
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communists. I don't want them running health care."ss That 
night CBS anchor Connie Chung reported, "The administration's 
bus caravan for health care kept on trucking today ... but 
the engines are groaning and flak is getting heavier with 
every step."56
What the press was not reporting was how nurses on the 
tour were busy collecting letters form constituents urging 
their representatives to support health care reform. Nor 
were reporters concerned about telling the stories of the 
"reform riders," who were mostly private citizens, and why 
they had joined the First Lady's crusade. However, there was 
not much room for stories such as these during the summer of 
1994. The national media was focusing on other matters : an
abortion clinic shooting in Pensacola, Florida, the 
horrifying scenes of people starving in Rawanda, the ethnic 
war in the former Yugoslavia, and primarily on the Simpson 
murder case.57 The compassionate, although political, 
intentions of the "Health Security Express" offered no news 
in a summer devoted to covering a football star, a murder, 
and a car chase.
Overall, the media's coverage of the political debate 
over President Clinton's Health Security Act raises serious 
questions as to whether American society can have an open, 
honest, democratic public policy debate. In fact, the debate
55 Ibid., 464.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 471-472.
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engenders pessimism in someone like Dr. Reed Tuckson, one of
the medical experts who offered advice to the Clinton
planners. As head of the Martin Luther King Jr./Charles Drew
Medical Center in the Watts section of South Central Los
Angeles, Dr. Tuckson knows from first hand experience the
struggle health providers can have. When he reflected on the
debate he wondered:
how America will ever have the maturity to address 
complex issues of public policy given the 
manipulation that is possible, given the talk show 
mentalities that are so filled with cynicism and 
pessimism and can^t-do, and with two-second sound 
bites on news that pass for transmission of 
information ... it is very possible that America 
does not have the ability, the capacity, the 
competence, to come together as a unified nation of 
people who are able and willing to tackle complex 
problems and work through a logical sequence of 
solutions. 58
Tuckson recognizes that the health care debate lacked 
forthrightness, that it often failed to be representative of 
most opinions, and that it was often truncated by news 
coverage. Much of this occurred because media content was 
formed by an interplay of influences. Anti-government themes 
and flak exacerbated a media feeding frenzy —  their drift 
away from discussing matters of policy, and toward covering 
the debate's more superficial aspects.
However, others might disagree with this point of view.
For instance, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky would most 
likely contend that the truncation of public debate was a 
product of functional control. The policymaking process is
58 Ibid., 540, 542.
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dominated by a powerful elite, who used the media to guide 
the public against a government takeover of the health care 
industry. On the other hand, Larry Sabato would most likely 
contend that the truncation of public debate was the result 
of a feeding frenzy, and was not representative of day-to-day 
news coverage. Members of the press perceived Clinton to be 
a flawed president, who was proposing a flawed health care 
plan, thus journalists went for the jugular at every 
opportunity.
The concluding chapter, "The Anti-Democratic Effects of 
America's Media," suggests that both of these approaches do 
not completely explain what happened to President Clinton's 
proposal, or how the health care debate was anti-democratic.
Instead of being a matter of functional control or the result 
of a feeding frenzy, press coverage of the debate exhibited 
the functional complexity of America's market-based mass 
media, which hampers the press's ability to define policy 
options and, therefore, truncates debate. This inability 
grows out of the media's reliance on established interests, 
trivial points, and conventional wisdom, and manifests into a 
feeding frenzy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION:
THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC EFFECTS OF AMERICA'S MEDIA
This analysis began by making three contentions. First, 
America's media has an ill-effect on the democratic process, 
but scholarly opinions diverge as to how those effects play 
out. The subsequent chapters shed light on this question by 
focusing on the relevant influences contributing to media 
content during the health care debate, and illustrating how 
content was saturated by anti-government themes, swayed by 
anti-reform propaganda, and ultimately propelled by a feeding 
frenzy.
Second, democracy is more than the semblance of 
competing ideas ratified by limited public choice, and 
America's press actually have a societal role in 
strengthening healthy democratic participation. A democratic 
press empowers people "to assert meaningful control over the 
political process by providing them with the information 
needed for the intelligent discharge of political 
responsibilities."i.
 ̂Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing 
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1988), 298.
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Third, the media's coverage of the health care debate 
illustrates how the media often fail to empower the American 
citizenry with the necessary information to play a meaningful 
role in managing governmental policy. Instead, the media 
often truncated the health care debate, failing to support a 
more substantive democratic process. Indeed, much of what 
passed as "debate" was either misinformation or trivial 
information, which lacked context and represented only the 
surface aspects or thin veneer of democracy.
The media were by no means legally required to cover the 
health care debate in a democratic fashion, and the anti­
democratic effect of media content does not necessarily 
entail that journalists are failing to rely on an equal 
distribution of information sources. However, the media can 
have an anti-democratic effect when the information they 
provide is primarily sensational and trivial detail. This 
type of information is often unnecessary or counterproductive 
because it can be either false or irrelevant.
Herman and Chomsky's thesis is built on the contention 
that misinformation is a primary element employed by elites 
to manufacture the public's consent to their agenda.2 On the 
other hand, Sabato stresses the prevalence of disinformation 
created by media feeding frenzies, which often trivializes 
political discourse. The press's continuous hunt for 
political scandal monopolizes a substantial amount of media 
resources to "the insignificant gaffe rather than to issues
2 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 2.
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of profound national and global impact; on many occasions, 
titillation has replaced transportation on the country's 
agenda, sex has substituted for serious d e b a t e . . . . i n  
other words, irrelevance has replaced relevance.
The combination of misinformation and disinformation in 
media content clouds the facts necessary for a populace to 
contribute to their democratic processes. If democracy is 
going to function with any meaning, then the media should 
focus on policy issues over political bickering, and attempt 
to portray the world accurately, not just the world according 
to the HIAA, Rush Limbaugh, or a handful of select reporters.
When media content is overly dependent on those who have a 
vested interest in the status quo, and it becomes saturated 
with their interpretations, its effect can be anti­
democratic .
During the health care debate, the overall effect of 
these factors is suggested by the Wall Street Journal-NBC 
News poll finding that forty-five percent of the population 
opposed President Clinton's Health Care Security Act, but 
that seventy-six percent favored an unlabeled plan which 
contained all the essential elements of Clinton's proposal.4 
Since many established interests were combative toward "the 
Clinton Plan," the conventional wisdom was that the 
population agreed and media content reflected this.
3 Larry Sabato, Feeding Frenzy; How Attack Journalism 
Has Transformed American Politics, (New York: The Free
Press, 1991) 209.
4 Hilary Stout, "Many Don't Realize It's the Clinton Plan 
They Like," Wall Street Journal. 10 March 1994, 1(B) and 6(B).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
Herman and Chomsky would likely claim that this type of 
anti-democratic effect is a function of elite propaganda, "to 
inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of 
behavior that will integrate them into the institutional 
structures of the larger society."5 On the other hand, Sabato 
would likely claim that the press's attention to political 
bantering —  such as that between the HIAA and the Clintons 
—  guaranteed that even the passive observer would find out 
about the controversy of the day. Therefore, the press not 
only played a part in setting the country's political agenda, 
their coverage also engendered public cynicism about the 
entire political process, and "the Clinton Plan."6
Whether one agrees with Herman and Chomsky, that media 
content indoctrinates the public to established norms; or 
with Sabato, that the media tend to fortify cynicism by 
highlighting daily controversies; the effect of either deters 
democracy. However, the media's anti-democratic effect can 
be worsened when media content lacks context, and Sabato's 
analysis of feeding frenzies clearly recognizes this. When 
coverage is superficial, reports about specific events can 
lack meaning and omit the circumstances in which events 
occurred.
The lack of contextual substance in the media's coverage 
of the health care debate was riddled by terms such as 
"liberal," "socialized medicine," and "the Clinton Plan."
5 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 1. 
® Sabato, Feeding Frenzy. 206-207.
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These terms often lacked accurate definitions, and each 
gained political force from its repeated use. As the public 
hears these terms over and over again, it can only decipher 
the language by relying on their own preconceived notions, 
and how the press frames the terminology, by way of the 
reporter's tone and the report's setting.
The term "Clinton Plan" is the best example of how the 
context of the debate deterred democratic decision making.
As negative connotations were attached to the president's 
proposal, the phrase "Clinton Plan" was fused into what 
George Orwell called "Newspeak," which functions "not so much 
to express meanings as to destroy them."? Perhaps Orwell 
foretold the future when he opined that the language of 
political discourse will become "ugly and inaccurate because 
our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our 
language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts."8
The following subsections concentrate on the media's 
anti-democratic effects on the health care debate. Each 
section illustrates how established interests, misinformation 
and the trivial context of media content, constituted the 
majority of this effect.
 ̂Jeff Cohen and Norman Solomon, Through The Media 
Looking Glass; Decoding Bias and Blather in the News 
(Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), 250.
8 Ibid., 252.
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The Liberal Myth
It was argued that media coverage of the health care 
debate was plagued by anti-government themes and the liberal 
myth. The media depicted the President's plan as a "liberal, 
big-govemment approach to health care reform. "9 Members of 
the media often relied on these themes instead of probing or 
discussing the plan or some of its suggested alternatives.
In effect, this did little to enhance public understanding of 
what was at stake, and how the country's health care problems 
might be solved.
Established interests played a significant role in 
promoting the liberal myth. The most blatant offense was 
that at least one television ad supporting a single-payer 
system, paid for by the interest group Neighbor to Neighbor, 
was kept off the air. The ads never "saw the light of day" 
because insurance agencies are major a d v e r t i s e r s . lo Members 
of the insurance industry have the ability to put economic 
and legal pressure on stations not to air ads contrary to the 
industry's interests. Thus, members of the status quo have 
greater access to the airwaves than do their less powerful 
counterparts.n
9 Theda Skocpol, Boomerang: Clinton's Health Security
Effort and the Turn Against Government in U. S. Politics (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 15.
The Great Health Care Debate, part of The Moyers 
Collection, (Princeton: Films for the Humanities and
Sciences, 1994). videotape.
Ibid.
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Not allowing a single-payer advertisement on the public 
airwaves narrowed mass media content to a few ads supporting 
Clinton's proposal and a great number opposing it. 12 At the 
same time, news media content fundamentally nullified the 
single-payer option. ABC's "Nightline" made reference to the 
option only twice during a seventeen month period. One of 
those instances was in an interview with President Clinton.
Anchor Ted Koppel suggested to the President that Canadians 
were dissatisfied with their single-payer system, when 
actually polls showed that only two percent of Canadians 
preferred the American health care system to their own. i3
Since the media concentrated on "the Clinton Plan," they 
lost sight of ccmpeting alternatives. In fact, Koppel could 
have noted that eighty-nine House Democrats had signed on to 
a single-payer bill sponsored by Representative McDermott, 
long before the President had made his p r o p o s a l .  in effect, 
the media's honing in on "the Clinton Plan" limited the 
public's choice of policy options to the "liberal Clinton 
Plan," or no plan at all.
Another fictitious element of the liberal myth was that 
Clinton's proposal was developed under a shroud of secrecy.
In actuality, members of the Health Care Task Force,
12 Ibid.
12 Nightline," March 1, 1994 as cited by Jim Naureckas 
and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader: An ExtraI Review 
of Press and Politics in the 90's (Boulder, Co.: Westview
Press Inc., 1996), 169.
14 Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System: The
American Wav of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 43.
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including Hillary Clinton, wanted to ensure that they could 
have free discussion, airing all possible solutions, without 
any press leaks or mis interpretations before the plan was 
complete. Very little about the task force was secret. By 
May, 1993 they had already met with 572 organizations, and 
when Hillary Clinton publicly testified before Congress, "not 
a single legislator complained about the 'closed' or 
'secretive' deliberations...."is However, many journalists, 
such as Johnson and Broder, continue to claim that the 
secrecy policy was a mistake that "ultimately deprived the 
public of essential information on which to form judgments."
Fallows counters that not allowing the press to be part 
of the task force's deliberations may have been a bad idea, 
but it is debatable that, in these early stages of the 
debate, this actually caused a void in public information.
To the extent that there was a void, it was filled by a 
greater offense —  the press's inaccurate depiction of the 
task force being a secret collection of liberal elites 
developing a scheme to take over health care. is
The shroud of secrecy mixed well with the conventional 
wisdom equating the President's plan to reform health care to 
being a liberal plan. It also seems that many in the public 
lacked a clear conception of his proposal outside the 
negative connotations evoked by the very buzzwords, "Clinton
James Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," Atlantic 
Monthly, 275 nl (January 1995): 28.
16 Ibid., 29.
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Plan." Evidence suggests that the media exacerbated the 
public's misunderstandings by not mentioning that "Clinton's 
health care program would have established the least statist, 
most market-^oriented system of universal health insurance to 
be found among the industrialized democracies."i?
Anti-Reform Flak
Anti-reform opponents used flak to play on the public's 
fear of a governmental takeover of health care. To a great 
extent, media coverage was driven by some of the more 
prominent propaganda campaigns and accusations made by 
popular talk radio. Effectively, the media reinforced their 
claims instead of questioning them, and media content 
amplified the anti-democratic effects of these voices.
Charles Lewis, of the Center for Public Integrity, 
suggests that during the health care debate the comparative 
advantage enjoyed by some interests was not conducive to 
democracy:
We have this facade, or this illusion of democracy.
We have the suggestion that everyone has been 
consulted and that there was a great debate. When 
in fact there wasn't, and I think that is dishonest 
and that its unethical, in a general sense, in 
terms of our society.... What is so insidious about 
this is that folks can use the tools that are 
available to them in our open society to distort a 
democracy or manipulate it to their own ends and 
that is something we have always cherished the 
right to do, and folks are more adept at doing it
Michael Lind, Up From Conservatism; Why the Right is 
Wrong for America, (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 263.
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today between technology and money then they've 
ever done in the past....
The illusion of there being a great health care debate 
was often captured by news coverage. In one instance news 
anchor Margaret Warner, of PBS's "MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour," 
suggested that "interest groups on all sides of the issue 
have taken to the a i r w a v e s . I n  reality, there were far 
more ads discounting "the Clinton Plan" than supporting it.20 
The strength of one of the more prominent television 
campaigns, the HIAA's "Harry and Louise" ads, was reinforced 
by the media crediting the couple with accuracy and 
effectiveness. However, Jamieson suggests that "Harry and 
Louise" were only effective as a public relations phenomenon. 
The HIAA advertised to get on the agenda of the national 
media, targeting areas such as New York, Washington and Los 
Angeles. At the same time they targeted the congressional 
districts of members acting on the bill in committee.21 
Their two prong approach was intended to influence the 
decision making process, to convince Congress to stop "the 
Clinton Plan," not necessarily to change public opinion.
The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
1® Jeff Cohen and Norman Solomon, Through The Media 
Looking Glass; Decoding Bias and Blather in the News 
(Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), 86.
20 The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
21 Darell M. West, Diane Heith and Chris Goodwin, "Harry and 
Louise Go to Washington: Political Advertising and Health Care
Reform," Journal of Health, Politics, Policy and Law, (Spring 
1996); 43, and The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
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For the most part, the media's extensive coverage of 
"Harry and Louise" validated the campaign's magnitude but, in 
another sense the content of the coverage was even more anti­
democratic. The press focused on how the ads jeopardized the 
President's effort, but did not focus on their accuracy, or 
on how they might contribute to solving the pressing 
problem. 22 By highlighting how "Harry and Louise" smeared the 
President's proposal, and not on the ads' contribution to the 
policy debate, the press trivialized the process.
At the same time, the press often conveyed that "Harry 
and Louise" represented the views of the "health insurance 
industry." Thus, media content inaccurately depicted a 
political battle between the Clintons and the "health 
insurance industry." In actuality, the battle was between 
the larger insurers, who had mapped out the President's 
proposal, and the smaller ones, represented by the HIAA.
Referring to Clinton's opposition as the "health insurance 
industry" contributed to the debate's narrow vernacular. It 
is perhaps not an exaggeration to suggest that much of the 
public was left assuming that "the Clinton Plan" was a 
"socialist scheme" cooked up by the "government" to take over 
one of the country's most important enterprises —  the 
"health insurance industry."
Exaggeration or not, this could almost be taken verbatim 
from the rhetoric used by Rush Limbaugh. Standing alone, his 
rampages against "the Clinton Plan" were nonconducive to
22 Ibid.
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democracy because his audience is captive. Limbaugh often 
makes strong contentions and, in a debate, the members of the 
audience could at least accept or reject his arguments.
However, in his monologues, one rarely gets that 
opportunity. 23
Moreover, the press often failed to question Limbaugh's 
false accusations —  in particular his claim that the 
Clintons were involved in covering up Vince Foster's death, 
and, more generally, his spreading false rumors such as 
"virtually no choice will exist for you if the Clinton plan 
passes "24
Indeed, the staff of ABC's "Nightline" seemed to verify 
his false claims. When Limbaugh implied that questions 
surrounding Whitewater, Vince Foster's death and other 
supposed scandals should offer a window into whether or not 
people can trust the President and his health care proposal, 
anchor Ted Koppel accepted Limbaugh's analysis without 
question.25 similar ccanpliance was shown when the program's 
producer, Jeff Greenfield, suggested that Limbaugh had 
"broadcast the rumor [about Vince Foster's death] as an 
example of the more wild stories circulating,"26 even though 
Limbaugh was greatly responsible for starting the rumor.
23 The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
24 Ibid.
25 Jim Naureckas and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair 
Reader; An Extrai Review of Press and Politics in the 90's , 
(Boulder, Co.: Westview Press Inc., 1996), 139-141.
26 Ibid., 140.
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Since the members of the press accepted the false claims 
of Rush Limbaugh and the HIAA, media content exacerbated 
their fear tactics, and anti-democratic effects. Allowing 
these opinions to seep into media content without being 
questioned undermined the public's comprehension of events.
If the press shrouds information with the misinformation of a 
few prominent actors, and focuses on trivial political 
bantering instead of matters of policy, they are failing to 
fulfill their societal role.
Feeding Frenzy
Anti-government sentiment and flak lead to a feeding 
frenzy. Media content highlighted the surface aspects of the 
debate at the expense of discussing more important policy 
matters. Consequently, press coverage tended to reaffirm 
both anti-reform sentiment and anti-reform flak. The former 
was fortified by the media's attempts to be objective. As 
Lindbloom and Woodhouse suggest, such attempts tend to 
reinforce "conventional interpretations of current events."27 
Since the American public is skeptical about government 
intervention and control it was logical for the media to 
portray the President's proposal as a government takeover of 
the health care system. Flak was reinforced because the 
competitive pressures of America's media propels their
27 Charles E. Lindblom and Edward J. Woodhouse, The 
Policy Making Process 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice Hall Inc., 1993), 117.
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reliance on both sources that are presumptively accurate, 
such as the HIAA, and sources that are entertaining, such as 
Rush Limbaugh. Even though much of their flak was political 
misinformation, the media tended to accept it as legitimate 
policy analysis.
As a member of the House Republican leadership, Dick 
Armey is also an established source of information, and his 
chart depicting "the Clinton Plan" as a bureaucratic 
nightmare played on anti-government sentiment. Even though 
the chart illustrated much of the already existing web of 
government and private insurance bureaucracy, it "soon 
appeared on television, inspired cartoonists and humor 
columnists, and became a staple of conservative attacks on 
the Clinton p l a n . "28
Two points can be made about the media's pack reaction 
to Armey's chart. First, most of the media accepted the 
Republican's interpretation of the plan. Why the press did 
not probe what the chart truly illustrated is debatable. On 
the one hand, many members of the press probably considered 
Armey to be an accurate news source. On the other hand, 
utilizing the chart was a way to save publication space, or 
broadcast time. Thus, media content gave the false 
impression that the government would have complete control of 
health care. Under the President's proposal, the private
28 Skocpol, Boomerang, 143-144.
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insurance industry would continue running health care, just 
as they now run Medicare.29
Second, the news vernacular explaining the chart lacked 
context. The media repeated terms such as "bureaucracy" and 
"rationing," without defining them, but attaching them to the 
President's proposal. The combined effect of the media 
giving credence to Armey's chart, while repeating some of the 
ambiguous or negative terminology it spurned, was anti­
democratic because it did not enhance the public's 
understanding of the more important aspects of the health 
care debate.
While some pack journalism mislead the public, 
scandalous feeding frenzies surrounding the White House 
tended to weaken Clinton's Presidential authority. The 
intermingling of news stories about Whitewater, Troopergate, 
and Vince Foster's suicide with coverage of health care 
reform portrayed an embattled Administration captured in 
headlines such as "On Arkansas, Sex, Not Inhaling, and 
Whitewater. "
What was left out of media content was how all of these 
things were connected, if they were at all. The terminology 
was generally negative but media content did not seem to 
explain why. Nonetheless, the health care issue commingled 
with each scandal contributing to the triviality of the 
debate. Thus, media content tended to distract the public's
29 Representative Pat Williams, interview by author. 
Tape recording, Missoula, Montana, April 25, 1997.
20 Johnson and Broder, The System, 263.
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attention away from the health care issue, and its 
importance, and not empower the public with information so 
that they could purposefully contribute to the debate.
Instead, trivial misinformation contributed to general 
misconceptions about the President's proposal and, in the 
end, to the public's rejection of the plan.
Unlike Armey's chart, or Whitewater, Elizabeth 
McCaughey's article "No Exit" was a feeding frenzy 
originating within the media. It is true, as Johnson and 
Broder claim, that McCaughey is not a journalist. However, 
her false accusations were accepted as accurate, incorporated 
into media content via the New Republic, and were positively 
received by prominent members of the media. Since her claims 
were false their anti-democratic effect is apparent. Media 
content supporting fictional assertions is not conducive to a 
healthy democracy.
The press's acceptance of McCaughey's argument also 
reveals the anti-democratic effects of journalists focusing 
on horse race aspects of political debate. Evidence suggests 
that the media's concentration on the mugging of "the Clinton 
Plan," and not on proposed solutions to the country's health 
care problems, eroded public support for any solution. The 
public turning away from comprehensive health care reform is 
a significant development considering that polls since 1982 
have shown that seventy percent or more of the population
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believes America's health care system needs to be either 
fundamentally changed or completely rebuilt.3i
The News and Democracy Without Citizens
News coverage of the health care debate portrayed a
"democracy without citizens." The press addressed the public
as spectators, not as citizens with the ability to make a
contribution to a democratic d i s c u s s i o n .  32 The result was a
public lacking a clear conception of what was at stake. Even
William Raspberry, a Washington Post columnist, noted:
[During the debate] it dawned on me that even as a 
fairly attentive consumer of news, I was never 
quite sure what was in any package or proposal. I 
knew only who seemed at the moment to be ahead on 
points, who was cheering for whom and what it all 
meant for Hillary's ascendancy or demise.33
To some extent, shallow press coverage was the product 
of America's free-market media. Since the public demands 
news that also entertains, media organizations are driven to 
cover the more superficial aspects of the political debates.
Health care reform was also a difficult story for the press
Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Don't 
Blame The Public for Failed Health Care Reform," Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20 n2 {Spring, 1995): 416- 
17.
22 Robert Entman, Democracy without Citizens; The Media 
and the Decay of American Politics, (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1989), as cited by W. Lance Bennett, The 
Politics of Illusion 3rd ed. (New York: Longman Publishers,
1996), 31.
22 william Raspberry, "Blow-by-Blow Coverage," 
Washington Post, 30 October 1995, as cited by James Carville, 
We're Right, They're Wrong; A Handbook for Spirited 
Progressives (New York: Random House, 1996), 113.
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to cover. Since time restraints restrict news programs to 
sound bite-journalism, television coverage of the debate was 
often fragmented.34 The print media, which "should have had 
more time to prepare longer in-depth articles [often] 
failed to meet the challenge; coverage was desultory, 
inconsistent, or focused on the political points being scored 
by opposing sides."35
However, market-pressures cannot be blamed for 
journalists drawing false comparisons between "the Clinton 
Plan" and a Canadian-style single-payer health care proposal.
Mar ket-pres sures cannot be the reason members of the mass 
media accepted the misinformation of "Harry and Louise," or 
tolerated the misleading accusations of Rush Limbaugh. Nor 
were market-pressures the only factors contributing to the 
media's feeding frenzy.
It was not just capitalistic pressures that swayed the 
media's coverage toward trivial conflicts and disagreements, 
and away from an explanation of policy alternatives and the 
pursuit of public c o n s e n s u s . 36 it was also their journalistic 
culture. Members of the press can be blinded by their own 
professional mind-set and driven by competitive pressures, 
but they do not tend to be a terribly rebellious lot. As Ted 
Koppel explains, "We tremble between daydreams of scooping 
all of our competitors and the nightmare of standing alone
Johnson and Broder, The System. 143.
35 Ibid,
36 Ibid., 634.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
with our scoop for too long ... many of us are truly only 
comfortable when we travel in a herd. "37 The question is how 
to direct the herd toward serving its citizenry, toward 
enhancing the democratic process, and away from covering the 
thin veneer of democratic debate.
Martin A. Lee and Norman Solcmon, Unrelia±>le Sources; 
A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media, (New York; 
Carol Publishing Group, 1991), 337.
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